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I. INTRODUCTION
The 'Olelo No'eau (Hawaiian proverb) above highlights the power of our
words: they can heal and give life; or, obfuscate and destroy. Telling a
story of a people and their 'dina (lands) can heal and shed light on a lhui's
(nation's) motives and thinking during the most critical junctures in its
history that impact all aspects of its culture, identity, and nationhood.
Indeed, the very recounting of this history-who tells it, how it is told,
which stories are shared, the nuances and complexities, the language
used-can enlighten, restore, and inspire healing and reconciliation. Or,
incite destruction.
In his recent article on the Crown Lands Trust,2 the late Chief Judge
James S. Bums (ret'd) took issue with several conclusions reached by the
late Professor Jon M. Van Dyke in his book, Who Owns the Crown Lands
of Hawai 'i?3 Professor Van Dyke, a noted legal scholar and constitutional
2 James S. Bums, The Crown Lands Trust: Who Were, Who Are, the Beneficiaries?, 38
U. HAw. L. REv. 213 (2016).
3 JON M. VAN DYKE, WHO OWNS THE CROWN LANDS OF HAWAI'l? (2008). In 2009,
Professor Van Dyke won the University of Hawai'i Board of Regents' Medal for Excellence
in Research, in large part, for his work on this tome. See Press Release, Univ. of Haw.,
Regents' Medal for Excellence in Research Awarded to Outstanding UH Factulty (Aug. 25,
2009), http://www.hawaii.edu/news/article.php?ald=3055; Regents Medal for Excellence in
Research, UNIV. OF HAW., https://www.hawaii.edu/about/awards/research07-1 1.php (last
visited Jan. 29, 2017).
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law expert, sought to advance understanding of the Crown Lands Trust and
provide a larger context for the Kanaka Maoli (Native Hawaiian)4
community's relationship to these important 'aina. Professor Van Dyke
concluded that these lands, which Kauikeaouli Kamehameha III
(Kamehameha III) had set aside as his personal lands during the 1848
Mahele,5 are subject to a trust that benefits the Native Hawaiian
community. That carefully grounded assessment-of a vested beneficial
Native Hawaiian interest in a significant portion of Hawai'i's lands-forms
a key pillar of present-day and future Kdnaka Maoli claims to reparative
justice. Through his work and words, Professor Van Dyke sought to
enlighten and inspire justice and healing.
The Bums article requires detailed responses that draw on the latest
research and scholarship in Native Hawaiian law, politics, history, and
more. This response interrogates the battle over the collective memory of
injustice surrounding important events in Hawai'i's history leading up to
the 1893 illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom and other wrongs
committed against Native Hawaiians, as well as their implications for
indigenous rights and justice struggles in Hawai'i and beyond.6 In the wake
of the 1893 overthrow, non-native historians developed and promoted a
narrative that what happened in Hawai'i was not an injustice.7 Instead of
4 The Hawaiian Dictionary defines "maoli" as native, indigenous, aborigine, genuine,
while "kanaka maoli" is defined as a Hawaiian native. MARY KAWENA PUKUI & SAMUEL H.
ELBERT, HAWAIIAN DICTIONARY 240 (rev. & enlarged ed. 1986). "Kanaka" is the singular;
"kanaka" is the plural. Id. at 127. The terms Kanaka Maoli and Native Hawaiian (plural)
are used interchangeably in this Article.
5 The 1848 Mahele references the division of all of the Kingdom's 'aina between the
mo'I or king, the ali'i or chiefs, and the government; each of these divisions reserved the
rights of the native tenants. More generally, the Mahele refers to the entire process that
resulted in a private property system in Hawai'i. Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie, Historical
Background, in NATIVE HAWAIIAN LAW: A TREATISE 2, 12-16 (Melody Kapilialoha
MacKenzie, Susan K. Serrano & D. Kapua'ala Sproat eds., 2015) [hereinafter NATIVE
HAWAIIAN LAW]; see also KAMANAMAIKALANI BEAMER, NO MAKOU KA MANA: LIBERATING
THE NATION 142-53 (2014) (discussing the Mahele as a means to secure the land rights of
Kanaka Maoli); LILIKALA KAME'ELEIHIWA, NATIVE LAND AND FOREIGN DESIRES: PEHEA LA
E PoNo Al? 201-25 (1992) (detailing the Mahele process dividing the 'aina between the
King and the Ali'i Nui (high chiefs), kaukau ali'i (lesser chiefs), and konohiki (land
stewards)).
6 Collective memory is a social construct contextualized for justice struggles by
Professors Sharon Hom and Eric Yamamoto. It explains that society's perception of history
and past events are actively created by individuals, institutions (such as the media), nations,
and other interests. Current understandings of past acts and the way they are related to
current conditions inform rights, claims, and power structures. See Sharon K. Hom & Eric
K. Yamamoto, Collective Memory, History, and Social Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1747
(2000). More detail on collective memory is provided in Part II, infra.
See, e.g., RALPH S. KUYKENDALL, THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM, 1778-1854:
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acknowledging those actions as a hostile takeover of an indigenous
sovereign, myopic historians crafted a narrative around sugar planters, the
economy, and land and power in Hawai'i that prevailed as the collective
memory and, thus, "history" for nearly a century.8 I ka '61elo no ke ola, i
ka '61elo no ka make. 9
For decades, indigenous scholars and their supporters have worked to
redress these inaccuracies and reconstruct a more accurate collective
memory of injustice.'o The Native Hawaiian sovereignty movement played
a significant role." In addition, legal scholars contextualized historical
events from a social justice perspective.1 2 By doing so, "they expand[ed]
FOUNDATION AND TRANSFORMATION (1938); RALPH S. KUYKENDALL, THE HAWAIIAN
KINGDOM, 1854-1874: TWENTY CRITICAL YEARS (1953); RALPH S. KUYKENDALL, THE
HAWAIIAN KINGDOM, 1874-1893: THE KALAKAUA DYNASTY (1967); see also Troy J.H.
Andrade, (Re)Righting History: Deconstructing the Court's Narrative ofHawai'i's Past, 39
U. [Aw. L. REV. 631, 680-81 (2017) (deconstructing the biased writing of non-native
historian Ralph S. Kuykendall who was hired by the Historical Commission of the Territory
of Hawai'i to frame history in a light most favorable to territorial government and noting
that some native scholars who were heavily influenced by Christianity and westerners were
also subject to such bias).
See, e.g., Andrade, supra note 7, at 679-82 (describing the danger in allowing non-
native and western-influenced historians to shape collective memory); see also Jonathan
K.K. Osorio & Kamanamaikalani Beamer, Sullying the Scholar's Craft: An Essay and
Criticism of Judge James S. Burns' Crown Lands Trust Article, 39 U. HAW. L. REV. 469
(2017).
9 PUKUI, supra note 1, at 129 (translated here literally as "in the word there is life; in the
word there is death").
10 See, e.g., BEAMER, supra note 5 (interrogating ali'i agency through various actions,
including the Mahele process); KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 5 (deconstructing the Mahele
process); DAVIANNA POMAIKA'I MCGREGOR, NA KUA'AINA: LIVING HAWAIIAN CULTURE
(2007) (overviewing the traditional resource management system); JONATHAN KAY
KAMAKAWIWO'OLE OSORIO, DISMEMBERING LAHUI: A HISTORY OF THE HAWAIIAN NATION
TO 1887 (2002) (detailing the history and politics of the Hawaiian Kingdom through 1887);
NOENOE K. SILVA, ALOHA BETRAYED: NATIVE HAWAIIAN RESISTANCE TO AMERICAN
COLONIALISM (2004) (documenting native resistance to colonialism and particularly the
overthrow and annexation); HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER:
COLONIALISM AND SOVEREIGNTY IN HAWAI'I (1999) (detailing the impacts of colonialism
and injustice in Hawai'i).
1 See, e.g., TRASK, supra note 10, at 1-25, 31-50 (analyzing the events that led to the
illegal occupation and overthrow of Hawai'i, and explaining the moral and political bases for
the Hawaiian sovereignty movement). Indeed, because of political and legal advocacy
stemming from the sovereignty movement, Hawai'i's legal regime now embraces principles
of restorative justice for Knaka Maoli. D. Kapua'ala Sproat, An Indigneous People's Right
to Environmental Self-Determination: Native Hawaiians and the Struggle Against Climate
Change Devastation, 35 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 157, 162 (2016).
12 See, e.g., Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6; R. Hokllei Lindsey, Native Hawaiians
and the Ceded Lands Trust: Applying Self-Determination as an Alternative to the Equal
Protection Analysis, 34 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 223 (2009-10); MacKenzie, supra note 5; Susan
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the law's narrow framing of injustice and focus[ed] on historial facts to
more fully portray what happened and why it was wrong. In this way,
history bec[a]me[] a catalyst for mass mobilization and collective action
aimed at policymakers, bureaucrats, and the American conscience." 3
The significance of these efforts to reclaim Hawai'i's collective memory
is paramount, because "framing injustice is about social memory,"' 4 and
constructing an accurate and compelling collective memory of injustice is a
predicate to fashioning just reparative actions in the future. "Who tells the
definitive history of group injustice-and how that history is framed-is
vital to shaping a group's narrative and public image. And it can
'determine the power of justice claims or opposition to them."" 5
Importantly, "[s]ocial understandings of historical injustice are largely
constructed in the present. Those understandings are rooted less in
backward-looking searches for 'what happened' than in the present-day
dynamics of collective memory."1 6  Indigenous and other scholars,
including Professor Van Dyke, reframed significant events in Hawai'i's
history to highlight the injustices to Kdnaka Maoli and reconstruct society's
collective memory of those incidents, such as the Mdhele process and
illegal nature of the 1893 overthrow. '7 In partial response, the Hawai'i
State Legislature and United States (U.S.) Congress apologized for past acts
and recognized the need to redress this loss of life, land, and sovereignty.
I ka '61elo no ke ola, i ka '61elo no ka make.19
K. Serrano, Collective Memory and the Persistence of Injustice: From Hawai'i's
Plantations to Congress-Puerto Ricans' Claims to Membership in the Polity, 20 S. CAL.
REv. L. & Soc. JUST. 353 (2011); D. Kapua'ala Sproat, Wai Through Kdndwai: Water for
Hawai'i's Streams and Justice for Hawaiian Communities, 95 MARQ. L. REv. 127, 137
(2011); Eric K. Yamamoto & Sara D. Ayabe, Courts in the "Age of Reconciliation ": Office
of Hawaiian Affairs v. HCDCH, 33 U. HAW. L. REv. 503, 527 (2011); Eric K. Yamamoto &
Jen-L W. Lyman, Racializing Environmental Justice, 72 U. COLO. L. REv. 311 (2001); Eric
K. Yamamoto & Ashley Kaiao Obrey, Refraining Redress: A "Social Healing Through
Justice" Approach to United States-Native Hawaiian and Japan-Ainu Reconciliation
Initiatives, 16 ASIAN AM. L.J. 5 (2009).
13 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1757.
14 Id. at 1756.
15 Serrano, supra note 12, at 359 (quoting Eric K. Yamamoto & Catherine Corpus Betts,
Disfiguring Civil Rights to Deny Indigenous Hawaiian Self-Determination: The Story of
Rice v. Cayetano, in RACE LAW STORIES 558 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds.,
2008)).
16 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1757 (emphasis added).
17 See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 10-12.
18 See, e.g., Act of Nov. 23, 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-150, 107 Stat. 1510 (1993)
[hereinafter Apology Resolution] (apologizing to the Native Hawaiian people for the U.S.
role in the illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom); HAw. REV. STAT. § 1OH-1 (2011)
(recognizing Native Hawaiians as the only indigenous people of Hawai'i); Act of July 1,
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Not surprisingly, a pushback is in full swing and reactionary forces are
attempting to resurrect the colonizer's memory of Hawai'i's history and
silence the indigenous narrative. The Bums article, intentionally or not,
feeds directly into this effort by re-inscribing the old, inaccurate memory. 2 0
There are numerous problems with this approach. For example, the article
relies on dubious sources of authority2' while ignoring leading experts in
the fields of Native Hawaiian history, culture, and politics. 2 2 The essay also
takes facts and events out of context to bolster its claims. 23  Most
problematic, however, is that the article reinvigorates the colonizer's
narrative which, in turn, undermines Kanaka Maoli legal claims.
"Individuals, social groups, institutions, and nations filter and twist, recall
1993, 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws 999 (acknowledging that Native Hawaiian sovereignty was
denied and contemplating action to restore indigenous rights and dignity); Act of July 1,
1993, § 2, 1993 Haw. Sess. Laws 1009, 1010 (enacted to "facilitate the efforts of native
Hawaiians to be governed by an indigenous sovereign nation of their own choosing"); Act of
June 30, 1997, § 1, 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 956, 956 (conceding that "the legislature
recognizes that the lasting reconciliation so desired by all people of Hawai'i is possible only
if it fairly acknowledges the past while moving into Hawaii's future").
19 PUKUI, supra note 1, at 129 (translated here literally as "in the word there is life; in the
word there is death").
20 The Burns article's incorporation of the old memory also threatens to re-traumatize
Kanaka Maoli and undo the reparation efforts following the illegal overthrow. See Rachel
L6pez, The (Re) Collection of Memory After Mass Atrocity and the Dilemma for Transitional
Justice, 47 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 799, 804 (2015) ("Efforts to deconstruct collective
memory have the potential to undo the healing accomplished through dialogue and
community identification.").
21 See, e.g., Burns, supra note 2, at 217 n.21 (citing the website HawaiiHistory.org), 218
n.22 (citing a 1993 National Park Service historic resource study), 225 n.59 and 226 n.70
(citing HISTORY OF THE HAWAIIAN KINGDOM, a seventh-grade textbook), 236 n. 116 (citing
the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which is an open access website, and the OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, a collection of essays), 236 n.117
(citing the BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY without giving the correct legal definition of the
term), 241 n. 139 (citing a collection of essays as fact, and without designating the author or
essay title), 242 n.142 (citing a website source for the Kuleana Act rather than the actual
Hawaiian Kingdom law).
22 See, e.g., supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Andrade, supra note 7;
Osorio & Beamer, supra note 8; Avis Poai, Tales from the Dark Side of the Archives:
Making History in Hawai'i Without Hawaiians, 39 U. HAw. L. REv. 537 (2017).
23 See Burns, supra note 2, at 236-38 (breaking down elected offices along racial lines
to support his assertion that Hawaiians had lost control of the Kingdom prior to 1893), 245
(arguing that because the mo'I and ali'i received land in the Mahele, it was not inequitable
because they were Hawaiian), 246-47 (alleging that the monarchs did not understand the
Crown Lands to be a collective resource without any credible support), 247-56
(misconstruing several documents cited by Professor Van Dyke); see also infra Section
III.A.1 (detailing Burns' misuse of State ex rel. Kobayashi v. Zimring, 58 Haw. 106, 566
P.2d 725 (1977)).
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and forget 'information' in reframing shameful past acts (thereby lessening
responsibility)[.]" 24 Given recent challenges to Native Hawaiian rights and
benefits at the local level, 25 the battle over the collective memory of
injustice in Hawai'i is critically important. After all, "[c]ollective memory
not only vivifies a group's past, it also reconstructs it and thereby situates a
group in relation to others in a power hierarchy." 2 6  Moreover, the
"recounting of history shapes the present-day understanding of injustice, the
current need for rectification, and the likely courses of action." 2 7
This response addresses specific inaccuracies in the Bums article, such as
Kamehameha III's intent behind the Mahele, the United States' pivotal role
in the illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, the subsequent transfer
of the Kingdom's national lands to the United States, and the legal
definition of Native Hawaiian, and explains how that framing perpetuates a
narrative of justice or injustice and, thus, supports or undermines the legal
basis for reparative action. Part II explores collective memory and explains
its significance for justice struggles in general and for Kanaka Maoli in
particular. Part III interrogates three examples from the Bums article and
Part IV explains how this conflicting and inaccurate collective memory
harms Native Hawaiian people, culture, and claims.
II. COLLECTIVE MEMORY'S VITAL ROLE IN SHAPING THE PUBLIC'S
UNDERSTANDING OF HISTORY AND NATIVE HAWAIIAN RIGHTS' CLAIMS
A. Understanding Collective Memory
In the early 1920s, French philosopher Maurice Halbwachs crafted the
phrase "collective memory" in his book Les cadres sociaux de la memoire
(On Collective Memory). 28 Halbwachs noted that memories are "linked to
24 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1758.
25 See Arakaki v. Lingle, 477 F.3d 1048 (9th Cir. 2007) (alleging that various state
programs gave special treatment to Native Hawaiians); Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice
Pauahi Bishop Estate, 470 F.3d 827 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (challenging Kamehameha
Schools' admissions policy as preferential based on race); Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934
(9th Cir. 2003) (claiming that various provisions of the Hawai'i Constitution violated the
Equal Protection Clause); Akina v. Hawai'i, 141 F. Supp. 3d 1106 (D. Haw. 2015), aff'd,
835 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2016) (challenging self-determination efforts by a group of Native
Hawaiians); Corboy v. Louie, 128 Hawai'i 89, 283 P.3d 695 (2011) (alleging that tax
exemptions for Hawaiian homestead lessees involved racial discrimination and violated the
U.S. Constitution).
26 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1758.
27 See Serrano, supra note 12, at 360.
28 See MAURICE HALBWACHS, ON COLLECTIVE MEMORY (Lewis A. Coser ed. & trans.,
Univ. of Chi. Press 1992) (1925) (addressing how human memory functions within a
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ideas we share with many others, to people, groups, places, dates, words
and linguistic forms, theories and ideas, that is, with the whole material and
moral framework of the society of which we are part." 2 9  Collective
memory is about more than simply recalling fixed collections of data
"retrieved from a brain storehouse." 30 Memories are produced through the
release of neurochemicals in the brain as people engage in complex
interactions with others and their social environments.3 ' These memories
are "constructed and continually reconstructed"3 2  as individuals
"subconsciously choose what to remember in ways that reflect their desires,
hopes, and the cultural norms of their social environment."3 3 Therefore, as
people grow and their opinions of the world shift, memories and past
experiences subconsciously change as well, shaping the way that they
understand past events and present circumstances.34
The purposeful development of collective memory generates significant
narrative structures that shape how society constructs and relates to
individual and group identity and claims. 35  "Memories of past events,
collective context).
29 Erika Apfelbaum, Halbwachs and the Social Properties of Memory, in MEMORY:
HISTORIES, THEORIES, DEBATES 77, 86 (Susannah Radstone & Bill Schwarz eds., 2010)
(quoting MAURICE HALBWACHS, LES CADRES SOCIAUX DE LA MEMOIRE 38-39 (Albin Michel
1994)) (explaining how mental images of the present reconstruct the memories of the past).
30 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1760 (describing the general insight of collective
memories). Memories of the past are not stored and retained in a "vacuum free from
external influence." L6pez, supra note 20, at 807.
31 See Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1760 (citing John H. Krystal et al., Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder: Psychobiological Mechanisms of Traumatic Remembrance, in
MEMORY DISTORTION: How MINDS, BRAINS, AND SOCIETIES RECONSTRUCT THE PAST 150,
154-55 (Daniel L. Schacter ed., 1995) [hereinafter MEMORY DISTORTION] (finding that the
release of neurochemicals in the brain during trauma contributes to the powerful
recollections of horrific events). See generally Cathy Treadaway, Materiality, Memory and
Imagination: Using Empathy to Research Creativity, 42 LEONARDO 231, 231 (2009)
("Emotional responses to sensory stimulation have been found to enhance the strength of
memories due to the release of neurochemicals in the brain.").
32 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1760; see also Lisa J. Laplante, Memory Battles:
Guatemala's Public Debates and the Genocide Trial of Jose Efrain Rios Montt, 32
QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 621, 635 (2014) (explaining how external factors such as media can
continue to (re)shape a society's collective memory for decades).
33 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1761 (citing Gerald D. Fischbach & Joseph T.
Coyle, Preface to MEMORY DISTORTION, supra note 31, at ix).
34 Id. (citing MARTHA MINOw, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS 64 (1998)
("People change, and the meanings of their past experiences change as their ways of
interpreting the world shift.")).
35 See id. (citing Craig R. Barclay, Autobiographical Remembering: Narrative
Constraints on Objectified Selves, in REMEMBERING OUR PAST: STUDIES IN
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY 67, 94 (David C. Rubin ed., 1996)).
488
2017 / A COLLECTIVE MEMORY OF INJUSTICE
persons, and interactions are culturally framed because they are subject to
socially structured patterns of recall, they are often triggered by social
stimuli and they are conveyed through communal language."3 6 Importantly,
these narratives "frame what is remembered and . .. stories reinforce a
group's identity and compose the frameworks people use to make the past
meaningful."3 7  In other words, narrative structures provide critical
context-the essential language, ideas, and images of the
"stories"-necessary to understand past events.38 They also connect the
past to the present, shaping "the past in light of how we see (or want to see)
ourselves and others" in this moment.3 9 For example, different historical
narratives of the wars between Native Americans and the U.S. government
produce conflicting views of Native Americans today.40 Some view those
wars as a repulsive history of racism while others see them as a necessary
foundation for building the United States as a nation.4 '
In addition to personal experiences, narratives of historical memory are
easily influenced by culture, politics, and economics, adding to the
36 Id. (citing Michael Schudson, Dynamics of Distortion in Collective Memory, in
MEMORY DISTORTION, supra note 31, at 346); see also L6pez, supra note 20, at 807
(reiterating Halbwach's discussion that common culture and experiences often bind and
define people in a group).
37 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1761-62 (quoting Barclay, supra note 35, at 94).
38 Id. at 1762; see also L6pez, supra note 20, at 809 (citing EMILE DERKHEIM, THE
DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 79 (George Simpson trans., 1933)) ("At other times,
collective memory reflects what sociologist Emile Durkheim called the collective
conscience, which is a nation's or society's collective understanding of its own history.").
39 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1762. Additionally, Maoli professor, scholar,
and activist Osorio writes:
This is our history. It is like the 'aina, to be shared with one another, to be fought
over, to be transformed by our own works and ideas, to be utterly destroyed by the
flow of change, as Pele does on Hawai'i, to be reborn alive with the new vegetation of
Hi'iaka. Yet the mo'olelo does not belong to us as a people either, so much as we
belong to it. Our history owns us, shapes and contextualizes us.
OSORIO, supra note 10, at ix.
40 See Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1762 (citing Schudson, supra note 36, at
346).
41 See id. (quoting Schudson, supra note 36, at 346). Michael Schudson also provides
another example of contrasting views of Native Americans. Id. For some, skeletal remains
of Native Americans contributed to the "impersonal history" of humans and were viewed as
"valuable specimens for scientific research." Id. In contrast, some viewed them as
"cherished property[,]" deserving of "reverent treatment and ... reburi[al] according to the
customs of Native American groups." Id.; see also Rennard Strickland, Genocide-at-Law:
An Historic and Contemporary View of the Native American Experience, 34 U. KAN. L. REv.
713 (1986) (describing the history of America's physical and cultural genocide of native
people and how that shaped Indian law's legal and political climate). See generally ROBERT
A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSE OF
CONQUEST (1990).
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complexity of how collective memory is socially constructed and subject to
manipulation.42 As a result of societal influences, historical memory is
selective and subjective. Historian Peter Burke explains:
A way of seeing is a way of not seeing, a way of remembering is a way of
forgetting, too. If memory were only a kind of registration, a "true" memory
might be possible. But memory is a process of encoding information, storing
information and strategically retrieving information, and there are social,
psychological, and historical influences at each point.43
Therefore, society's collective memories are continually molded by
contemporary values and ideological pressures.
University of Hawai'i Law Professor Eric Yamamoto highlighted
collective memory's significance in a social justice context, noting that the
struggle for justice is largely based on how the public and courts view a
group's story and image through its history of injustice.4 4 In this legal
context, collective memory informs the way in which historical injustices
are "aggravated or salved." 45  As Professor Yamamoto observed,
"[i]ndividuals, social groups, institutions, and nations filter and twist, recall
and forget 'information' in reframing shameful past acts (thereby lessening
responsibility) as well as in enhancing victim status (thereby increasing
power)."46 The "recounting of historical events often determines whether,
and to what extent, historical injustice occurred and the present-day need
for rectification." 47
42 See Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1762; MINOW, supra note 34, at 118-20
(highlighting how political leaders often alternate between remembering and forgetting
memories to change the public's view surrounding certain societies and events).
43 Peter Burke, History as Social Memory, in MEMORY: HISTORY, CULTURE AND THE
MIND 97, 103 (Thomas Butler ed., 1989).
4 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1756-57; see also Laplante, supra note 32, at
624-25 (describing the "memory battle" surrounding the criminal proceedings against
Guatemala's former leader, General Jos6 Efrain Rios Montt, in obtaining justice).
45 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1757; see Jody Lyne6 Madeira, When it's So
Hard to Relate: Can Legal Systems Mitigate the Trauma of Victim-Offender Relationships?,
46 Hous. L. REv. 401, 425 (2009) ("Legal decisions thus become touchstones for the
formation of collective memory, as they 'set the tone for the public's response at the very
moment that they claim to express it' and 'prefigure popular sentiment and give it a degree
of definition which it would otherwise lack."' (internal citations omitted)).
46 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1758; see also MINOW, supra note 34, at 119
("[M]emory becomes a political tool ... [as t]he double-edged dangers of too much and too
little memory lead contemporary figures to make paradoxical calls about remembering the
past.").
47 Serrano, supra note 12, at 363 (citation omitted). For example, the Native Hawaiians
Study Commission, which was commissioned by Congress to assess the federal
government's responsibility to the Native Hawaiian community in the 1980s, drew heavily
from Kuykendall's work. Andrade, supra note 7, at 680-81; Native Hawaiians Study
490
2017 / A COLLECTIVE MEMORY OF INJUSTICE
Professor Yamamoto was among the first to consider collective
memory's implications for Kanaka Maoli rights and entitlements, centering
on the consequences of the 1893 illegal overthrow of the sovereign
Hawaiian nation.48  The overthrow catalyzed not only the suppression of
Native Hawaiian culture and language, but also the development of
derogatory characterizations of Kanaka Maoli.49 Native Hawaiians seeking
justice for the loss of their government and homelands continue to build
their "own new understandings of 'what happened' and 'who [they] were'
partly in order to claim 'what is rightfully [theirs]."' 0 This underscores the
importance of collective memory in Hawai'i, and how it incorporates
ancestral memories" to lay a foundation for contemporary Kanaka Maoli
legal claims.52
Commission Act, Pub. L. 96-565, tit. 3, 94 Stat. 3324 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2991a
note). Ultimately, the Commission decided that the federal government was not responsible
for the illegal overthrow. Andrade, supra note 7, at 681; NATIVE HAWAIIANS STUDY
COMM'N, REPORT ON THE CULTURE, NEEDS AND CONCERNS OF NATIVE HAWAIIANS,
PURSUANT TO PUBLIC LAW 96-565, TITLE III 320 (1983).
48 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1759-60; see MacKenzie, supra note 5, at 20-21
(discussing the history of Hawai'i from the founding of the Hawaiian Kingdom to the
acquisition of Hawai'i by the United States); see also infra Section III.A and accompanying
text (detailing historical background).
49 Foreigners continued to subdue practices that did not comply with western cultures.
"Those who deposed the queen felt that the suppression of both native Hawaiian culture and
'olelo Hawai'i was strategically necessary to prevent a countercoup and to secure Hawai'i a
protected status under the United States." Kamanaonapalikihonua Souza & K. Ka'ano'i
Walk, 'Olelo Hawai'i and Native Hawaiian Education, in NATIVE HAWAIIAN LAW, supra
note 5, at 1270 (citation omitted). "[Native] Hawaiians were sometimes pejoratively
described by white American missionaries (savages and pagans), businessmen
(incompetents), and politicians (a dying race), and later by racial immigrant groups (lazy and
uneducated)." Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1760 (citing ToM COFFMAN, NATION
WITHIN: THE STORY OF AMERICA'S ANNEXATION OF THE NATION OF HAWAII (1998)).
5o Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1760. Indeed, "[t]his linkage of events to identity
and then to rights implicates contemporary notions of group and nationhood." Id.
5t Ancestral memories are oral traditions passed down through generations via vanous
means of communication, including genealogies, place names, and chants. See id. at 1759
(defining ancestral as "genealogy preserved orally over generations through chants" (citation
omitted)); Kekuewa Kikiloi, Rebirth of an Archipelago: Sustaining a Hawaiian Cultural
Identity for People and Homeland, in 6 HIIYLILI: MULTIDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH ON
HAWAIIAN WELL-BEING 73, 78 (2010).
52 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1759-60. Kinaka Maoli are "still struggling with
the ramifications of the U.S. government-aided illegal overthrow.... [t]hey lost their
government and homelands and had their language and culture suppressed." Id. at 1760.
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B. Collective Memory's Power and Potential
Collective memory is critically important; it is shaped by and in turn
shapes perceptions of justice and injustice, thereby impacting the claims
and rights of Native Hawaiians and other historically disadvantaged groups.
Collective memory's significant role in justice struggles extends beyond the
historical facts and into the mind, spirit, and culture of both the past and
present. 3 Through this process, memories are constructed in the context of
"not only rights norms but also larger societal understandings of injustice
and reparation."5 4  The back-and-forth struggles between conflicting
collective memories are generally struggles between colliding ideologies
and worldviews." Importantly, collective memory can be used regressively
or progressively, depending on who deploys the more compelling
56
narrative.
1. Collective memory's practical implications for justice struggles in
Hawai'i and beyond
In elucidating collective memory's power and potential for justice
struggles, Professor Yamamoto identified five strategic points. First,
53 Id. at 1764; see Mark J. Osiel, Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative
Massacre, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 463, 475 (1995) ("Collective memory ... consists of the
stories a society tells about momentous events in its history, the events that most profoundly
affect the lives of its members and most arouse their passions for long periods.").
54 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1764. Collective memories serve as a "healing
power" for societies that experience trauma after mass atrocities. See L6pez, supra note 20,
at 811-12 (citation omitted) ("In the wake of tragic deaths, there is a societal need for an
explanation about what occurred and for collective understandings of the root causes of
violence.").
5 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1764. As Edward Said notes:
[Stories are] the method colonized people use to assert their own identity and the
existence of their own history. The main battle in imperialism is over land, of course;
but when it came to who owned the land, who had the right to settle and work on it,
who kept it going, who won it back, and who now plans its future-these issues were
reflected, contested, and even for a time, decided in narrative.
EDWARD SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERALISM xii (1993).
56 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1764. "The ideological aggression which tends
to dehumanize and then deceive the colonized finally corresponds to concrete situations
which lead to the same result. To be deceived to some extent already, to endorse the myth
and then adapt to it, is to be acted upon by it." ALBERT MEMMI, THE COLONIZER AND THE
COLONIZED 91 (1965); see Yamamoto & Betts, supra note 15, at 564 (citation omitted)
("Both proponents and opponents of redress select certain events or images to shape their
version of the story."); see also infra Section II.B.2 (explaining how the U.S. Supreme Court
used collective memory regressively in Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000)).
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"[j]ustice claims of 'right' start with struggles over memory."5 7 Collective
memories differ depending on locale, group experiences, and cultural
norms, which create conflicting memories within different groups.
Therefore, it is important to understand and "engage the dynamics of group
memory of injustice."5 9
Second, the "[g]roup memory of injustice is characterized by the active,
collective construction of the past." 6 0 As noted earlier, memories are not
fixed recollections of past experiences. Collective memory is a social
construct that continues to be shaped by present-day "interactions among
people, institutions, media, and cul[]tural forms." 6 1 Collective memories,
therefore, "are not found, but rather are built and continually altered." 62
Third, "[t]he construction of collective memory implicates power and
culture." 6 3  "[J]ustice claims often turn[] on which memories are
5 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1764; see Yamamoto & Betts, supra note 15, at
563 (citing GEORGE LAKOFF, DON'T THINK OF AN ELEPHANT!: KNow YOUR VALUES AND
FRAME THE DEBATE-THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE FOR PROGRESSIVES (2004)) ("Those struggles
are a fight over who will tell the dominant story of injustice (or absence thereof) and how
that story will be shaped.").
58 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1764. ("[I]mages, ideas, and recollections ... are
filtered and interpreted to present particular understandings of the past[J" creating different
versions of collective memories); see Laplante, supra note 32, at 623.
59 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1764. For example, several legal scholars note
that constructing and fighting for certain collective memories establish foundations for
redress and reconciliation after mass trauma. See MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY,
COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAw 6 (1996) ("[T]he best way to prevent recurrence of
genocide, and other forms of state-sponsored mass brutality, is to cultivate a shared and
enduring memory of its
horrors-and to employ the law self-consciously toward this end."); MARTHA MINOW,
BREAKING THE CYCLES OF HATRED: MEMORY, LAW, AND REPAIR 16 (2002) ("[S]ome people
will always remember what happened, but if there are no collective efforts to remember, a
society risks repeating its atrocities by failing to undo the dehumanization that laid the
groundwork for them.").
60 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1764; see Samuel (Muli) Peleg, Quintessential
Intractability: Attractors and Barriers in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, 16 CARDOZO J.
CONFLICT RESOL. 543, 571 (2015) (citation omitted) ("Developing collective memory
involves the construction of a selective and encouraging presentation of the past especially
with regard to the intractable conflict.").
61 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1764; see L6pez, supra note 20, at 807 (citation
omitted) ("Our interactions with the world deeply color what we perceive our past lives to be
and how we remember important events.").
62 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1764. The construction of collective memory
constantly adds and forgoes new pieces of recollections. It is "more like an endless
conversation than a simple vote on a proposition." OSIEL, supra note 59, at 47 (quoting John
Thelen, Memory and American History, 75 J. Am. HIST. 1117, 1127 (1992)).
63 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1765. Collective memories most often involve
power struggles between political leaders and community members; see Laplante, supra note
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acknowledged by decisionmakers." 64 The struggle over collective memory
is thus "hotly contested by those supporting and those opposing justice
claims." 65  Ultimately, different collective memories are fundamental
disagreements on worldviews and ideologies.66 When those in power are
threatened by groups reconstructing historical injustice, they seek to
discredit the developing memory or resurrect the old memory themselves to
maintain the status quo.67 Another common practice is to "partially
transform the old memory ... into a new memory ... that justifies
continued hierarchy." 68
Fourth, "[t]hese contests over historical memory regularly take place on
the terrain of culture-of which legal process, and particularly civil rights
adjudication, is one, but only one, significant aspect." 6 9 Decisionmakers
32, at 623 ("The positions taken up by memory-makers are often political, especially when
the stakes are high and different consequences flow from each interpretation.").
64 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1765; see Laplante, supra note 32, at 623
(citation omitted) ("[C]ollective understanding of the past can lead to the pursuit, or
frustration, of accountability; shape a national political agenda; and dramatically impact a
society's identity both internally and externally.").
65 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1765; see Roger Michel, Book Review, 88 MASS.
L. REV. 117, 119 (2003) (reviewing MARTHA MINOw, BREAKING THE CYCLES OF HATRED:
MEMORY, LAW, AND REPAIR (2002)) ("[R]eparations are a way for an oppressor group to
validate the often forcibly suppressed memory of its victims.").
66 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1765; see also Peleg, supra note 60, at 553
(2015) (describing the negative views Israelis and Palestinians have of each other's
narratives). Compare KUYKENDALL, supra note 7 (portraying the colonization of Hawaiian
society as welcomed by the Hawaiians), with SILVA, supra note 10 (refuting the myth of
Kanaka Maoli passivity and nonresistance to political, economic, linguistic, and cultural
oppression, beginning with the arrival of Captain Cook to the struggle over annexation), and
BEAMER, supra note 5, at 197 (disagreeing with "any proposition that the overthrow was
causally connected to ali'i acceptance of law as defined by Europeans. . . . It was not
Hawaiian acceptance of the law that led to the overthrow; rather, it was the oligarchy's
conspiring against the law.").
67 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1765. See generally Eric K. Yamamoto, Susan
K. Serrano & Michelle Natividad Rodriguez, American Racial Justice on Trial-Again:
African American Reparations, Human Rights, and the War on Terror, 101 MICH. L. REV.
1269, 1316 (2003) (noting the significance of presenting a new collective memory for groups
seeking reparations).
68 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1765. An example includes transforming the old
memory, depicting that slavery benefited the slaves, into a new memory, portraying that
slaves could not handle freedom, to justify continued segregation. Id. (citing Reva Siegel,
Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State
Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1129-31 (1997)).
69 Id. For example, political constraints may have affected the "production and
preservation of accurate collective memory" regarding the Rwandan genocide. Jos6 E.
Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365,
398 (1999) ("It remains to be seen whether that tribunal ... will be able to engage in the
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"determine[] which cultural practices, images, and narrative formally frame
the memories. And those memories in turn legitimate future understanding
of and action on justice claims." 70
Finally, it is vital that participants in justice struggles "conceive of law
and legal process as contributors to-rather than as the essence of-larger
social justice strategies." 7 ' Therefore, rights struggles must aim to both
"achieve the specific legal result and . . . contribute to construction of social
memory as a political tool." 7 2
Professor Yamamoto's five strategic points underscore collective
memory's powerful role in justice struggles in Hawai'i and beyond. In
particular, they highlight the ongoing battle over collective memory as well
as the importance of responding to the Bums article due to its implications
for Kanaka Maoli culture and claims. Purposefully or not, that piece
attempts to inscribe the old, inaccurate memory of Hawai'i's history and
undermine the legal basis for Native Hawaiian rights.
2. Rice v. Cayetano: A disturbing example of how collective memory
can be deployed to dismantle Native Hawaiian self-determination
Professor Yamamoto's analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Rice v. Cayetano7 3 illustrates how collective memory can be deployed to
kinds of broad-gauged historical inquiries into the Rwandan genocide that are essential to
preserving collective memory and to generating public confidence in its accuracy."). Thus,
"[c]ollective memory ... should be constructed by the collective; it should be a product of
local civil-society...." Id. at 399.
7o Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1765 (citation omitted). Examples of non-legal
symbolic processes that also share collective memories include cultural expressions through
"books, museums, memorials, murals, commemorative parks, ceremonies, art, and
theater[.]" Laplante, supra note 32, at 628.
71 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1765. Osorio notes:
All of the most significant transformations in nineteenth-century Hawai'i came about
as legal changes: in rulership, in land tenure, in immigration, and especially in the
meaning of identity and belonging. The Hawaiian saying "I ka 'olelo ke ola, i ka
'olelo ka make" reminds us that language is a creator and a destroyer, and law is
nothing if not language.
OSORIO, supra note 10, at 251; see also MINOW, supra note 59, at 19 ("[C]ollective memory,
carr[ies] the chance ... of rebuilding societies. . . .").
72 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1765 (citation omitted) ("[I]t is never enough for
societal outsiders only to frame the injustice narrowly to satisfy legal norms."). For
example, a court's decision on which collective memory prevails achieves both a legal result
and contributes to social memory. See Serrano, supra note 12, at 360 (citation omitted) ("A
judge's recounting of history shapes the present-day understanding of injustice, the current
need for rectification, and the likely courses of action.").
73 528 U.S. 495 (2000). Some text in this section discussing Rice and its players initially
appeared in Sproat, supra note 12.
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undermine Kanaka Maoli rights and advances in self-determination. At
bottom, this decision was "a fierce battle over conflicting histories" with
significant impacts for Native Hawaiians. 4 It also illuminates "the political
and cultural dynamics and strategic import of collective memory for justice
claims processed through the U.S. legal system."75
In 1996, Harold "Freddy" Rice, a descendant of a white missionary
family, filed suit against Hawai'i governor Ben Cayetano, seeking to
invalidate the Office of Hawaiian Affairs' (OHA's) indigenous Hawaiians-
76 clie -,
only election for the agency's Board of Trustees. Rice claimed that the
voting restriction violated the Fifteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
U.S. Constitution and discriminated against non-Hawaiians. 77  The state
74 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1771; see Yamamoto & Betts, supra note 15, at
563.
7 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1777. Often, judges strategically set up
narratives in such a way to "blot out the collective memory of racism." See Yamamoto &
Betts, supra note 15, at 567 (citing David Breshears, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back:
The Meaning of Equality and the Cultural Politics of Memory in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke, 3 J.L. Soc'y 67, 88 (2002)).
76 See Rice, 528 U.S. at 509. The Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) is an agency of the
State of Hawai'i established as a result of the 1978 Constitutional Convention to combat the
lingering effects of colonialism by improving the conditions of Hawai'i's indigenous people.
See HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 5; Legal Basis, OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS,
http://www.oha.org/about/history/constitution/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2017). The agency's
mission is "[t]o mlama [(protect)] Hawai'i's people and environmental resources, and
OHA's assets, toward ensuring the perpetuation of the culture, the enhancement of lifestyle
and the protection of entitlements of Native Hawaiians, while enabling the building of a
strong and healthy Hawaiian people and nation, recognized nationally and internationally."
OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, 2010-2018 STRATEGIC PLAN OF THE OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN
AFFAIRS 2 (2010), http://www.oha.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/ohastratplanbroch0312web-1.pdf. OHA currently manages
almost 30,000 acres of land. OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, 2015 OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN
AFFAIRS ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2015), http://www.oha.org/wp-
content/uploads/OHA2015AR.pdf. Because of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Rice, a
board of nine trustees elected by the general public (as opposed to Native Hawaiians), now
governs the agency. Legal Basis, OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS, supra. "The Board of
Trustees is responsible for setting OHA policy and managing the agency's trust." Id.; see
Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie, Native Hawaiians and U.S. Law, in NATIVE HAWAIIAN
LAW, supra note 5, at 273-76, 284-90 (discussing the creation of OHA and the Rice v.
Cayetano decision).
n See Rice, 528 U.S. at 510 (claiming that OHA's voting limitation facilitated racial
discrimination). Rice was a:
[W]hite rancher whose ancestors came to Hawai'i in the mid-1800s as Christian
missionaries and eventually built a ranching empire on land that had formerly
belonged to Native Hawaiians. Despite having benefitted personally (including
accumulating land and other resources) as a direct result of his family's role in
colonizing Hawai'i, Rice sued the State of Hawai'i for not allowing him to vote in
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explained that the Native Hawaiian people, similar to Native Americans,
constitute a "political" class as opposed to a "racial" minority, and
therefore, the election was legal.
The underlying battle in Rice focused on the competing collective
memories of the Native Hawaiian experience. The U.S. Supreme Court
majority ignored the indigenous narrative and narrowly crafted a story of
racial discrimination against whites while conveniently omitting "the deep
history of white racism integral to the dismantling of the Hawaiian
nation." 79  The majority's collective memory in Rice "distort[ed]
progressive civil rights and erase[ed] human rights."o For native groups
and Kanaka Maoli in particular, this decision "generated precedent for
forthcoming cases that undermine[d] the principle of justice through
reparation"8 ' and threatened native programs nationwide.8 2 Moreover, the
OHA elections, claiming this restriction contravened the Voting Rights of 1965 as well
as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Although each of those laws was
specifically crafted to protect historically disadvantaged groups, Rice turned the laws
on their heads, wielding them against a historically disadvantaged group to challenge
the group's ability to elect trustees for an agency designed to manage Indigenous
resources in partial redress for the devastation imposed by American colonialism.
Sproat, supra note 12, at 158-59 (citations omitted).
78 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24, 553-54 (1974). The U.S. District Court
for the District of Hawai'i rejected Rice's claims and upheld the State of Hawai'i's treatment
of Native Hawaiians as a political entity. Rice v. Cayetano, 963 F. Supp. 1547, 1548,
1553-58 (D. Haw. 1997). In doing so, Judge David Alan Ezra both recognized Native
Hawaiians as the archipelago's indigenous people and respected their continuing relationship
with the state and federal governments as analogous to other native people throughout the
United States. Id. at 1548, 1553-54. The Ninth Circuit affirmed. Rice v. Cayetano, 146
F.3d 1075, 1076 (9th Cir. 1998). But, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Rice, 528 U.S. at
498-99.
79 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1775. See David Barnard, Law, Narrative, and
the Continuing Colonialist Oppression of Native Hawaiians, 16 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L.
REv. 1, 40 (2006) ("[T]he narratives work together to erase almost all historical traces of
Western race-based usurpation and dispossession of Native Hawaiians."); see also
Yamamoto & Betts, supra note 15, at 568 (quoting Breshears, supra note 75, at 88)
("Breshears interprets the growing mainstream acceptance of colorblindness in lieu of
traditional civil rights racial awareness as a convenient 'forgetting' used to 'assuage the
feelings of guilt that plague the collective white conscience."').
so Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1777; see Barnard, supra note 79, at 40. Barnard
noted:
The Court's selective and biased historical reporting, despite the initial disavowal of
any ideological purpose, perpetuates colonialist condescension toward native peoples;
avoids the most uncomfortable facts concerning a near-genocidal population decline;
glosses over the cunning manipulation of natives who were unfamiliar with Western
constructs of private property; and depicts the agents of the overthrow of the legitimate
government of Hawaii as liberators and defenders of democratic rule.
s1 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1777 (citation omitted); see Yamamoto & Betts,
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legal and practical impacts of the case-twisting the rule of law to enable
non-natives to once again attempt to direct the management of Native
Hawaiian resources administered by OHA-"extend[ed] far across the
social justice landscape." 83
Deliberately or not, the Bums article employs a similar approach to re-
inscribe an erroneous memory of Kdnaka Maoli by deploying a narrative
analogous to the one devised by the Rice majority. For example, the article
wrongly claims that before the 1893 overthrow, indigenous Hawaiians did
not control their government, downplaying, if not justifying, the overthrow
of the monarchy.8 4 The essay contends that Native Hawaiians gave up their
sovereignty rights to a mix of Hawaiians and Caucasians before the
overthrow, and thus Native Hawaiians "did not expressly, implicitly or by
operation of law retain 'inherent sovereignty' or any rights to self-
determination. They unconditionally relinquished sovereignty and all
subordinate rights including inherent sovereignty and rights to self-
determination[,]" thereby dismissing a significant aspect of the 1993
Apology Resolution in which the United States apologized for its role in the
overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom." These and other inaccurate
characterizations distort the collective memory of the injustices committed
against Kdnaka Maoli and discount the legal and other vehicles established
to right those wrongs.
supra note 15, at 567 (citing Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 416
F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2005)) (highlighting how the non-Hawaiians in Doe used Rice to
challenge Kamehameha Schools' preference for Hawaiian children on racial discrimination
grounds); see also Decision & Order Re Motions for Summary Judgment at 15, Davis v.
Guam, Civ. No. 11-00035, 2017 WL 930825, at *15 (D. Guam Mar. 8, 2017) (political
status referendum that limits voting to "native inhabitants of Guam" violates both the
Fifteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution); Davis v. Commonwealth
Election Comm'n, 844 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that a provision of the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands constitution restricting voting in certain
elections to those of Northern Marianas descent violates Fifteenth Amendment voting
rights).
82 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1776; see Kimberly A. Costello, Rice v.
Cayetano: Trouble in Paradise for Native Hawaiians Claiming Special Relationship Status,
79 N.C. L. REv. 812, 852 (2001) ("Native Hawaiians risk losing not only programs that
benefit them, but any chance to attain the sovereignty they seek.").
83 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1771; see Costello, supra note 82, at 852 (noting
how the decision in Rice leaves any "legislation vulnerable to challenge," including
congressional plenary power over Native Americans).
84 Burns, supra note 2, at 238.
85 Id. at 253-54 (disagreeing with the Apology Resolution's statement that the
overthrow "resulted in the suppression of the inherent sovereignty of the Native Hawaiian
people" and "deprivation of the rights of Native Hawaiians to self-determination"). But see
Osorio & Beamer, supra note 8, at 472 (noting the three decades of scholarship showing the
strategic leadership of Hawaiian ali'i during the Kingdom period).
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III. I KA 'OLELO No KA MAKE-WORDS CAN DESTROY
Words, like their related constructions-sentences, phrases, and paragraphs
are not used simply to communicate. It is the deeper meaning in words, their
layered definitions, and even intentional ambiguities, which rivet the attention
and evoke the tears, clarify the thought and articulate a position.86
The late Kanaka Maoli scholar and Hawaiian Studies professor T. Kanalu
Young poetically explained the significance of our words. As noted in the
introduction to this response, for Hawai'i's indigenous people, words must
be selected with care because they possess the power of life and death.
Their kaona, or hidden meaning, imparts deep wisdom and levies serious
consequences both for those deploying a term and the object (or person)
that expression is directed towards.
Three representative examples highlight the need for this response.
Judge Bums' article, intentionally or not, resurrects the colonizer's
narrative while also ignoring nearly forty years of research and scholarship
in key historical and legal arenas. Resuscitating this old, erroneous
memory is both hurtful to Native Hawaiians and undermines indigenous
legal claims by actively constructing the past in a misleading way.
Interrogating inaccuracies from the article illuminates the significance of
the collective memory of injustice for both Kdnaka Maoli and our legal
claims, including interests in the Crown Lands Trust.
A. Dividing the 'Aina-Kamehameha III's Goal in the MThele
1. Burns' claims regarding the Mahele are misleading
At bottom, most of Judge Bums' dissatisfaction with Professor Van
Dyke's conclusions in his Crown Lands book is rooted in a
misinterpretation of history. An excellent case in point is their
contradictory understandings of the Mdhele and, in particular, Kamehameha
III's goal in replacing the Native Hawaiian approach to land stewardship
with a hybridized private property regime. Kamehameha III's intent is a
critical factor impacting both the collective memory of injustice and current
Kdnaka Maoli claims to the Crown Lands.
To bolster an overarching narrative, the Bums article framed
Kamehameha III's rationale underlying the Mdhele as an act of self-
86 Kanalu Young, An Interdisciplinary Study of the Term "Hawaiian," 1 HAw. J. OF L.
& POL. 23, 23 (2004).
87 Compare Bums, supra note 2, at 231-32, 240-43, with VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at
30-50.
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interest. The article goes so far as to unequivocally declare that
Kamehameha III's "primary goal" throughout the Mdhele process was to
selfishly secure his personal lands." Interestingly, Judge Bums gives rather
short shrift to developing this argument, which scarcely exceeds one page,
most of which is devoted to reproducing the State ex rel. Kobayashi v.
Zimring89 opinion.90 He relies heavily on that decision, which was authored
by Chief Justice William S. Richardson, for the proposition that
Kamehameha III's intent in instituting the Mdhele was to secure his
personal lands to ensure that they would not be considered public domain
and subject to seizure by a foreign power should Hawai'i ever be taken over
by another nation.9' The Zimring case, however, stands for the proposition
that new lava-created 'dina is public (not private) property; it did not
discuss Kamehameha III's overall goal for the Mdhele. Zimring, in turn,
quotes from In re Kamehameha IV, 92 which dealt specifically with the
Crown Lands and Kamehameha III's reason for establishing his personal
'dina. Again, that case did not discuss Kamehameha III's overall goal for
the Mdhele, but merely his intent with regard to his personal lands. 93 Thus,
neither case supports the assertion that Kamehameha III's overall goal in
the Mdhele was to secure his own lands.94
Taken together, none of the cited authorities, what might be termed a
"cascade of precedent," do anything to support the article's interpretation of
Kamehameha III's goals- "primary" or otherwise. As a result, the three
short non-Zimring paragraphs in that section, while nicely bookending the
block quote, ignore the Kdnaka Maoli narrative and are decidedly one-
dimensional. 95
In citing authority to buttress the claim that Kamehameha III was acting
out of his own self-interest, the Burns article ignores more recent
88 Bums, supra note 2, at 232.
89 58 Haw. 106, 566 P.2d 725 (1977).
90 Bums, supra note 2, at 231-32 (including an excerpt from State ex rel. Kobayashi v.
Zimring, to bolster the claim that Kamehameha III's primary goal in the Mahele was to
secure his personal lands); see also id., at 219-21 (lengthy excerpt from State ex rel.
Kobayashi v. Zimring as a means of "explain[ing] the Great Mahele[]").
91 Id. at 231-32.
92 2 Haw. 715 (Haw. Kingdom 1864).
93 In Kamehameha IV, the Hawai'i Supreme Court noted the King's desire to "promote
the interest of his Kingdom," and therefore "he proceeded with an exalted liberality[,]" to set
apart the larger portion of his land for government use. Id. at 722. Kamehameha IV also
references Privy Council Records in its extrapolation of the events and circumstances
leading to the Mahele. Id. at 721-22.
94 See BEAMER, supra note 5, at 142-53 (arguing that the Mahele was meant to secure
the rights of Native Hawaiians); KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 5, at 169-225 (detailing the
process for and many of the events leading to the Mahele of 1848).
95 See infra Section III.A.3.
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scholarship on the Mahele, which includes significant original research in
'Olelo Hawai'i. 96  Without legal or other support, these empty claims
attempt to resurrect a collective memory of ignorant and greedy chiefs and
disregard the native memory of Kamehameha III as a deliberate and
thoughtful leader who married Native Hawaiian tradition with western legal
precepts to create a private property system to respect and protect the rights
of the hoa'aina, the native people of the land.9 7 By resurrecting derogatory
and inaccurate images of ali'i (chiefs), the article seeks to undermine
indigenous claims to the Crown Lands and justifies the appropriation and
continued use of that 'aina by others, including the United States. It is
critical to respond to these inexactitudes because "justice claims often turn[]
on which memories are acknowledged by decisionmakers." 98
96 See, e.g., KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 5; BEAMER, supra note 5. Beamer's No Mikou
ka Mana received multiple awards, including the Samuel M. Kamakau Book of the Year
Award in 2015 from the Hawai'i Book Publishers Association. See Ka Palapala Po'okela
Awards (2015), HAWAI'I BOOK PUBLISHERs Ass'N, www.hawaiipublishers.org/
awards archives_2015.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2017); Pakalani Bello, "No Mikou ka
Mana " is Named Hawai'i Book of the Year, I MUA (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.ksbe.edu/
imua/article/no-maakou-ka-mana-wins-samuel-m.-kamakau-award/.
97 Compare Burns, supra note 2, at 222, 242, 247 (blaming Kamehameha III and the
ali'i for the maka'ainana's failure to receive more lands in the Mahele), with Lindsey, supra
note 12, at 250-51 (describing Kamehameha III's brilliance in designing and facilitating the
Mahele). Lindsey explained the Mahele's purposeful design and significant benefits for
Kanaka Maoli:
[T]he Government lands would provide for his people by strengthening the Kingdom's
independence while the King's lands guaranteed the continuation of traditional
responsibilities, allowing the King to protect his people directly. Through his act the
King established two trusts for the Native Hawaiian people, both imbued with
traditional precepts and both to be held for the benefit of the Native Hawaiian people.
Like the practice of kalai'aina, the Mahele affirmed Kauikeaouli's control of 'aina: he
granted the chiefs land, he created the Government lands for the benefit of the chiefs
and people, and he retained the King's land as his own. Moreover, it strengthened his
sovereignty-land was privatized, securing Hawai'i as a civilized nation-and
Kauikeaouli would be able to protect his people. His achievement was significant
both in a traditional and contemporary context. To create the trusts the King balanced
traditional precepts with the modern legal reality that he faced. Privatization of land
was not "merely thrust upon [an] unresponsive . . . societ[y]." Indeed, it was the
"outcome of an interaction." In modem terms, it was an act of self-determination
intended to enable continued self-determination. It sealed Native Hawaiians' interests
as owners, practitioners, and beneficiaries.
Id. at 250 (internal citations omitted).
98 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1765.
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2. Native Hawaiian insights regarding the Mahele
The politics and history of the Mahele are far more complex than the
short analysis presented in the Bums article. And, given the ramifications
of specious claims on both collective memory and Native Hawaiians'
vested beneficial interest in the Crown Lands, more context is required:
Hawaiians traditionally viewed and treated land as a member of their family
and clearly not something that could be owned and bought or sold.
Land and water were the foundations of their survival; 'aina, that which feeds,
and wai, the source of all life. Many of Hawai'i's maka'ainana, the
commoners who held this traditional view and practiced its resultant
principles, found themselves strangers in their own land during the transition
from their traditional view, lifestyle and relationship with the land, to this new
and foreign commodity driven concept necessitated for the most part by ever
increasing and dominating western influences. 99
The Mahele, meaning to divide or share, was one of the defining events
in Hawaiian history.' 00 Indeed, more than an event, it was a complex
process of dividing out the recognized interests of the ali'i or chiefs,
including the King, the government, and the common people or native
tenants, in all the land of Hawai'i.'0 ' In the years leading up to the Mahele,
Kamehameha III and his chiefs had begun to selectively adapt European
and American concepts and integrate them into traditional Kanaka Maoli
concepts of governance.102 This adaptation was articulated in the 1839
Declaration of Rights, which secured protection to "all the people, together
with their lands, their building lots, and all their property. . . . [N]othing
whatever shall be taken from any individual, except by express provision of
the laws."1 03
The following year, Kamehameha III promulgated the Constitution of
1840, which specifically recognized the interests of the chiefs and people in
'ina, in common with the King as head of the government:
Kamehameha I, was the founder of the kingdom, and to him belonged all the
land from one end of the Islands to the other, though it was not his own
private property. It belonged to the chiefs and people in common, of whom
99 Moses K.N. Haia III, Quiet Title Actions Harm Hawaiians, HONOLULU STAR-
ADVERTISER, Jan. 25, 2017, at A12 (the kahako ('O1elo Hawai'i diacritical mark) are added).
1oo MacKenzie, supra note 5, at 12-16.
101 Id.
102 BEAMER, supra note 5, at 104-53.
103 1839 Declaration of Rights, reprinted in TRANSLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
LAWS OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS ESTABLISHED IN THE REIGN OF KAMEHAMEHA III 10 (1842)
[hereinafter TRANSLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION].
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Kamehameha I. was the head, and had the management of the landed
property.1 04
This provision outlined trust concepts that were foundational to Native
Hawaiian society. And, for the first time, the interests of the people, the
chiefs, and the King in the land were formally acknowledged. 0 5
There are complex events and reasons that ultimately resulted in a
division of the interests of all-the people, the chiefs including
Kamehameha III, and the government-in 'ina or land.1 06  Of major
concern was that Hawai'i might be annexed or taken by one of the "Great
Powers"-the United States, Great Britain, or France-and that with
undivided interests in the land, native property rights would not be
respected.'0 7  Thus, in 1845, a Land Commission was established to
investigate and validate or reject land claims.' 8 In doing so, the Land
Commission based its decisions on the Kingdom's existing land laws
including "native usages in regard to landed tenures[.]"1 09 In 1846, the
Land Commission adopted seven principles, with a preface explaining that
"there are but three classes of persons having vested rights in the lands,-
1st, the government [(the King)], 2nd, the landlord, and 3d, the tenant[.]"" 0
104 KINGDOM OF HAW. CONST. of 1840, reprinted in TRANSLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 103, at 11-12 (1842) (emphasis added).
105 MacKenzie, supra note 5, at 12-16.
106 For various perspectives on the factors leading to the Mahele, see generally
KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 5, at 169-225; ROBERT H. STAUFFER, KAHANA: HOW THE LAND
WAS LOST 9-76 (2004); BEAMER, supra note 5, at 142-48; Mark 'Umi Perkins, Kuleana: A
Genealogy of Native Tenant Rights 33-47 (May 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Hawai'i at Manoa) (on file with authors).
107 In 1843, Lord George Paulet, captain of the British warship Carysfort, took control of
the Hawaiian government for five months, partially in response to a lease dispute involving
the British consul. KAME'ELEIHIWA, supra note 5, at 183-85. The Paulet incident had been
carried out against the backdrop of Great Britain's annexation of Aotearoa (New Zealand) in
1840, France's seizure of the Marquesas in 1842, and France's establishment of a
protectorate over Tahiti in the same year. Id. Moreover, in early 1845, the United States
annexed Texas, and ultimately gained California, Arizona, Nevada, and Utah, "all at the
expense of Spain." TOM COFFMAN, supra note 49, at 56-57. Hawai'i's leaders feared
incursions by American mercenaries to Hawai'i given American intervention in the West
and Southwest. SYLVESTER STEVENS, AMERICAN EXPANSION IN HAWAII 1842-1898, at 42-
44 (1945).
1os The official title of the Land Commission was the "Board of Commissioners to Quiet
Land Titles." Act of Dec. 10, 1845, pt. I, ch. VII, art. IV, reprinted in 1 STATUTE LAWS OF
HIS MAJESTY KAMEHAMEHA III, KING OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS 107 (1845-46) [hereinafter
1 STATUTE LAWS] ("An Act to Organize the Executive Departments of the Hawaiian
Islands").
109 Id. § 7, reprinted in 1 STATUTE LAWS, supra note 108, at 109.
110 These principles were subsequently passed by the Kingdom's Legislature and signed
into law by Kamehameha III. Act of Oct. 26, 1846, reprinted in 2 STATUTE LAWS OF HIS
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Significantly, the Land Commission recognized and validated the
underlying and foundational concept that all Native Hawaiians had rights in
the land.
Although the Commission's goal was to partition these undivided
interests, without an initial division of rights between the ali'i and the King,
little could be accomplished. Thus, there was an active discussion in the
Kingdom's Privy Council among the chiefs, Kamehameha III, and his
western advisors before a final plan was adopted."' Under that plan,
Kamehameha III would retain his private lands "subject only to the rights of
the tenants."1 2  The Kingdom's remaining 'ina would be divided into
thirds: one-third to the Hawaiian government; one-third to the chiefs and
konohiki; and the final third to the native tenants, "the actual possessors and
cultivators of the soil[.]"113
The process to separate out the interests of the King from the interests of
the chiefs began on January 27, 1848. All transactions were recorded in the
Buke Mahele (Mdhele Book).1 4 In essence, each division was a quitclaim
arrangement between the King and a particular ali'i or chief." 5 After the
last division between Kamehameha III and the chiefs on March 7, 1848, the
chiefs had received approximately 1.6 million acres of the 'ina of Hawai'i,
MAJESTY KAMEHAMEHA III, KING OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS 83 (1847) ("Approving
Principles Adopted by the Board of Commissioners to Quiet Land Titles, in Their
Adjudication of Claims Presented to Them").
11 Privy Council Minutes, December 18, 1847, at 280-308, http://punawaiola.org/fedora/
get/Punawaiola:720021847002/CompositePDF720021847002.
112 Id. at 282.
113
114 BUKE KAKAU PAA NO KA MAHELE AINA (1848) [hereinafter BUKE MAHELE].
115 In the BUKE MAHELE, pages on the left side of the book identify the lands in which a
chief surrendered his or her interests to the King, with a signed statement by the chief
relinquishing any rights to the land and acknowledging that such lands belong to the King.
See id. Similarly, pages on the opposite (right) side of the book list the lands in which the
King surrendered his interest to an individual chief or konohiki, with a signed statement by
the King agreeing to the division and giving permission for the chief to take the claim to the
Land Commission. See id.; Louis CANNELORA, THE ORIGIN OF HAWAII LAND TITLES AND OF
THE RIGHTS OF NATIVE TENANTS 12-13 (1974). The division between the King and the
chiefs, however, did not convey any title in land to the chiefs. Kamehameha III merely
agreed that an individual chief or konohiki could present the claim to the Land Commission.
JON J. CHINEN, THE GREAT MAHELE: HAWAII'S LAND DIVISION OF 1848, at 20-21 (1958).
Even an award from the Land Commission did not convey fee simple title to a chief or
konohiki; the chief or konohiki was required to pay a commutation fee to the government,
either in land or money, for the title to the land to be confirmed. CANNELORA, supra, at
26-27. The chief or konohiki would then be issued a Royal Patent from the government
giving fee simple title. Id. at 28. Notably, both the Land Commission Award and Royal
Patent issued by the government contained a reservation of the rights of native tenants.
CHINEN, supra, at 12-16.
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while the King held an estimated 2.5 million acres.116 Kamehameha III
then set aside the larger portion of this 'aina, about 1.5 million acres,
"forever ... unto his Chiefs and People."" 7 He retained for himself, his
heirs and successors, the remaining lands, approximately 984,000 acres."
These private lands became known as the King's Lands (eventually the
Crown Lands) and were also subject to the rights of native tenants.11 9 This
demonstrates that the rights of native tenants were expressly recognized and
validated at every stage of the Mdhele process.
Noted Kanaka Maoli scholar and professor Kamanamaikalani Beamer,
who has done extensive original research on the Mdhele and the motivating
factors for early lawmaking by Hawaiian ali'i, provides additional context
for the Mdhele. He notes the similarities and differences between the
Mahele and kalai'aina, the traditional division of 'ina when a new ali'i or
chief gained authority:
The Mahele was .. . a hybrid initiative-similar to a kalai'aina in its
participants and in the way the lands were distributed, but different because
the title provided to the recipient was subject to the rights of native tenants.
Perhaps the biggest difference is that the Mahele was to be the final
kalai'aina. 'Aina conveyed through the Mahele allowed a chief to take the
award to the Land Commission, where the title would be validated. These
awards enabled chiefs to gain allodial or fee-simple title upon payment of a
commutation, which extinguished the government's interest in those lands.
Once the government's interest in 'aina was removed, chiefs could then
receive a Royal Patent that confirmed fee-simple ownership of the 'aina,
which continued to be "subject to the rights of native tenants." This process
meant that even fee-simple allodial title to 'aina was a hybrid kind of private
property, one that continued to have a condition on title that was to provide
for maka'ainana, as was consistent with early Hawaiian custom.120
This complex history uncovers a very different story than the one told in
the Bums article. Rather than a self-serving and greedy King, this narrative
describes a deliberate and thoughtful ali'i who crafted a hybrid process that
116 Davianna Pomaika'i McGregor, The Cultural and Political History of Hawaiian
Native People, in OUR HISTORY, OUR WAY: AN ETHNIC STUDIES ANTHOLOGY 351 (Gregory
Yee Mark, Davianna Pomaika'i McGregor & Linda A. Revilla eds., 1995); JEAN HOBBS,
HAWAII: A PAGEANT OF THE SOIL 52 (1935).
11 Act of June 7, 1848, 1848 SUPPLEMENT TO THE STATUTE LAWS OF HIS MAJESTY,
KAMEHAMEHA III, KING OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS 22 (listing of lands and ratifying division
of lands). This second division was also recorded in the Buke Mahele. See BUKE MAHELE,
supra note 114, at 225.
118 See In re Kamehameha IV, 2 Haw. 715, 722-23 (Haw. Kingdom 1864); VAN DYKE,
supra note 3, at 42.
119 Act of June 7, 1848, supra note 117, at 25.
120 BEAMER, supra note 5, at 144.
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respected indigenous tradition while always seeking to protect the interests
of the hoa'aina, the people of the land.12' This active, collective
construction of the past is vital to undergird the group memory of injustice
in Hawai'i, including the fact that despite Kamehameha III's specific
actions to protect native land from foreign interests, the United States
ultimately took both the Government and Crown Lands. The United States
later transferred title to those lands to the State of Hawai'i, but the interests
of Kanaka Maoli have yet to be fully addressed. Ultimately, this collective
memory of injustice highlights "the political and cultural dynamics, and the
strategic import of collective memory for justice claims processed through
the US legal system[.]"1 22
3. Actual evidence ofKamehameha III's intent
In addition to the invaluable context provided by the indigenous
narrative, including the complexity of the Mahele process, primary
authority from the nineteenth century imparts additional support for the fact
that one of Kamehameha III's principal goals in the Mahele was to protect
Native Hawaiian land from foreigners.1 23 For example, the Privy Council
minutes at the root of the article's assertion of the King's self-interest
appear to be those taken at a meeting of the Council on December 18,
1847.124 That day in Council, the King is recorded as speaking three
times.1 25 The Council was in the process of voting to approve the seven
general rules and principles to guide the impending land division between
the chiefs and Kamehameha III as drafted by Justice William Little Lee.1 26
The seventh and last of these rules appears to have given the King
pause.1 27 Rule seven called for Kamehameha III's personal lands to be
entered into a separate book entitled "Register of the lands belonging to
Kamehameha III King of the Hawaiian Islands."1 28 Before a vote was taken
121id
122 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1777.
123 VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 43.
124 Privy Council Minutes, December 18, 1847, supra note 111, at 280-308; see
Kamehameha IV, 2 Haw. at 722. Justice Robertson's opinion in Kamehameha IV does not
provide any citation to the specific Privy Council records on which he bases his
interpretation, but his mention of the King's desire to protect his land from confiscation by a
foreign power provides a potent clue, as that subject did specifically arise in the Privy
Council on December 18, 1847. See id. at 722; Privy Council Minutes, December 18, 1847,
supra note 111, at 304, 306.
125 Privy Council Minutes, December 18, 1847, supra note 111, at 304, 306.
126 Id at 280, 304.
127 Id at 304.
128 Id at 284.
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on the Rule, the King broached the question of whether his personal lands
would be more susceptible to confiscation by a foreign power if they were
recorded separately from those of other ali'i.1 29  Minister of Foreign
Relations Robert C. Wyllie opined that the recognition of Hawai'i's
independence by the United States, Great Britain, and France would keep
other potential aggressors at bay, and Justice Lee added that except in the
case of resistance, and conquest by a foreign power, the King's right to his
private lands "would be respected." 3 0 The King then said that "unless it
were so, he would prefer having no lands whatsoever[.]"13' This
pronouncement stands in stark contrast to the allegations that Kamehameha
III's "primary goal" was the self-serving preservation of his own landed
interests. It is instead proof that Kamehameha III had an express goal of
"protecting the lands of the Native Hawaiians from foreigners."13 2 Finally,
Kamehameha III instructed the Privy Council that he wished his lands to be
listed in the same book as the other ali'i, so that in the event of a foreign
invasion, all ali'i lands would be considered together as privately owned
lands, separate from the Government Lands, and therefore less likely to be
appropriated by the invading power.'3 3 This exchange regarded a very
specific aspect of the Mdhele, namely the format in which the lands of the
various ali'i (including the King) would be recorded and thus distinguished
from Government Lands. 3 4  At no point in the Privy Council minutes
addressing land division did the King discuss any personal "goals" for the
enactment of the Mdhele at large. 3 5 Instead, the larger discussion provides
important insight regarding the King's ultimate intent to protect Native
Hawaiian land from foreigners.
"Zooming out" from the original Privy Council records and the opinion
in In re Kamehameha IV, 3 6 the Burns article's reliance on State ex rel.
Kobayashi v. Zimring'3 7 in this section of his article must next be
scrutinized.' 38 To support an allegation of unmitigated royal self-interest,
129 Id. at 304.
130 Id. at 304-06.
131 Id. at 306 (emphasis added).
132 VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 43; Bums, supra note 2, at 231.
133 Privy Council Minutes, December 18, 1847, supra note 111, at 308. The language of
the rule was amended and passed by the Privy Council. Id.
134 id.
135 See id.; Burns, supra note 2, at 232; In re Kamehameha IV, 2 Haw. 715, 722 (Haw.
Kingdom 1864).
136 2 Haw. 715 (Haw. Kingdom 1864); see supra note 118 and accompanying text.
137 58 Haw. 106, 566 P.2d 725 (1977).
138 The Zimring opinion did not address the disposition of the Crown Lands, but included
a recitation of basic Mahele history to support the court's conclusion that the State held title
to 'aina newly formed by lava on the island of Hawai'i. See id. at 111-15, 566 P.2d at
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the piece includes the following passage from Chief Justice Richardson's
opinion in Zimring:
In 1847, the King together with the Privy Council determined that a land
mahele, or division, was necessary for the prosperity of the Kingdom. The
rules adopted to guide such division were, in part, (1) that the King shall
retain all his private lands as individual property ... 139
Taken out of context, the casual reader may be inclined to agree that such
a rule proves the article's claim regarding the King's intent. The selected
language, however, provides only the beginning of an enumerated list.
Indeed, in reviewing the case itself, one finds this passage directly
following that quoted: " . . . and (2) that of the remaining lands, one-third
was to be set aside for the Government, one-third to the chiefs and
konohiki, and one-third for the tenants."1 4 0 Reducing the length of a quoted
passage is not in and of itself alarming. Truncating this passage, however,
especially when the omitted portion directly contradicts the assertion put
forward, leads a reader to draw conclusions based on an incomplete truth.
Taken in full, the demonstrable intent of the King and his Council was to
protect the landed interests of all Native Hawaiians, including "tenants."
The "tenants" language is deeply significant. As a result of the Mahele
process, all lands of the Kingdom-whether the personal lands of the ali'i,
the King's Lands, or the Government Lands included a reservation for the
rights of native tenants.141 These tenants were the maka'ainana or hoa'aina
who, with their families, had occupied portions of lands, often for
generations.1 42  Based on that inherent right, maka'ainana during the
Mahele era could claim title to parcels of land under the Kuleana Act of
730-32.
139 Bums, supra note 2, at 231 (citing Zimring, 58 Haw. at 112, 566 P.2d at 730). In
other parts of the Burns article, the full passage from Zimring is given. Bums, supra note 2,
at 220, 241.
140 Zimring, 58 Haw. at 112, 566 P.2d at 730. To support his own rendition of the
historical reasons for the Mahele, Chief Justice Richardson cites the very Privy Council
records mentioned above as the likely source of Justice Robertson's version of Mahele
history in Kamehameha IV. See id. (citing Kamehameha IV, 2 Haw. 715; Privy Council
Minutes, supra note 111, at 250-308).
141 CHINEN, supra note 115, at 29; Palama v. Sheehan, 50 Haw. 298, 300, 440 P.2d 95, 97
(Haw. 1968) (noting that during the Mahele process whole ahupua'a (divisions of land that
roughly approximate watersheds) were awarded but the rights of native tenants were
expressly reserved, "Koe ... [ke] Kuleana o [na] Kanaka"); Harris v. Carter, 6 Haw. 195,
205 (Haw. Kingdom 1877) (explaining that Mahele and subsequent awards were "subject to
the rights of native tenants").
142 See OSORIO, supra note 10, at 53-56 (discussing the Kuleana Act, the impact on
maka'ainana, and the change in traditional political and social relationships between
classes).
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1850.143 Moreover, Royal Patents, which were given to ali'i and others
designating their title to lands, and Kuleana claims were affirmed by the
courts of the era as direct acts of the King himself.1 4 4
Other clues from case law and the historical record further contextualize
Kamehameha III's motives in designing and facilitating the Mahele.
Returning to Kamehameha IV, Justice Robertson discusses the two
instruments "signed and sealed" by Kamehameha III and included in the
Buke Mahele.1 4 5 The first instrument reserved the King's personal lands.1 4 6
The second instrument relinquished the King's interest in lands listed on
several pages of the Buke, to be "set apart forever to the chiefs and people
143 Act of Aug. 6, 1850, reprinted in 1850 PENAL CODE OF THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDs 202-
04 (1850) ("Granting to the Common People Allodial Titles for Their Own Lands and House
Lots, and Certain Other Privileges"); see MacKenzie, supra note 5, at 14-16 (discussing the
Kuleana Act). Indeed, in the Privy Council discussions on the law that would become the
Kuleana Act, the King was adamant that the native tenants should receive not merely land,
but recognition of their traditional rights of access and gathering for "a little bit of land, even
with an allodial title, if they [the people] were cut off from all other privileges, would be of
very little value." Privy Council Minutes, July 13, 1850, 713 (1850),
http://punawaiola.org/fedora/
get/Punawaiola:720021850001/CompositePDF720021850001 (statement of King
Kamehameha III). Although some chiefs objected to including such a clause in the law,
eventually "the proposition of the King, which he inserted as the seventh clause of the law,
as a rule for the claims of common people to go to the mountains, and the seas attached to
their own particular lands exclusively" was agreed to by the chiefs. Privy Council Minutes,
Aug. 27, 1850, 763 (1850), http://punawaiola.org/fedora/get/Punawaiola:720021850001/
CompositePDF720021850001. The provision under discussion in the Privy Council became
section 7 of the Kuleana Act, currently codified at Section 7-1 of the Hawai'i Revised
Statutes. See HAw. REV. STAT. § 7-1 (2016); David M. Forman & Susan K. Serrano,
Traditional and Customary Access and Gathering Rights, in NATIVE HAWAIIAN LAW, supra
note 5, at 788-94 (discussing section 7 of the Kuleana Act and cases interpreting the
provision).
144 See Kekiekie v. Edward Dennis, 1 Haw. 42, 43 (Haw. Kingdom 1851); Kukiiahu v.
William Gill, 1 Haw. 54, 55 (Haw. Kingdom 1851). Likewise, when the courts held in favor
of Kuleana Act claimants, as against the new owners of a larger surrounding tract, they did
so on the premise that the King himself had created the reservation of rights for native
tenants. Kekiekie, 1 Haw. at 43 ("[I]n the Royal Patent conveying the land to the defendant,
the King had made an express reservation of the claims of tenants."); Kukiiahu, 1 Haw. at 55
("[T]he King in his patent has made a special reservation for the benefit of this and all other
claimants. The King did not convey Kukiiahu's rights to Gill[.]"). Combined with the full
reproduction of C.J. Richardson's summary of the King's reasons for the Mahele in Zimring,
this judicial recognition of the King's direct hand in reserving the rights of native tenants
demonstrates a clear royal interest in the wellbeing of the maka'ainana, and renders
ineffectual any attempts to reduce the Mahele to a mere act of kingly self-preservation. See
58 Haw. at 112, 566 P.2d at 730; supra text accompanying note 140.
145 2 Haw. at 722-23 (drawing from a portion of the case not cited by Burns).
146 Id. at 723.
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of my Kingdom."1 47 While the court provides both the original Hawaiian as
well as the English translation of the first instrument in Kamehameha IV,
only the English translation is given for the second instrument.1 48 In this
second instrument, the first instance of the word "people" appears in
Hawaiian as simply "kanaka," the second instance of "people" is a
reduction of the more complex Hawaiian phrase "poe lahui kanaka."1 4 9 The
court in Kamehameha IV gives the following translation: "to have and to
hold to my chiefs and people forever.", 5 0  Distinguished Kanaka Maoli
scholar and professor Lilikala Kame'eleihiwa translates the same phrase as:
"in order that my Chiefs and my Hawaiian people may dwell and establish
themselves firmly upon the lands forever."' 5 ' Despite these differences in
translation, there can be little doubt that the "po'e lhui kanaka" or the
"people" the King refers to are the native people of the Hawaiian Kingdom.
Thus, it was in fact an express goal of Kamehameha III, at the very outset
of the Mahele, to preserve a land base for all Hawaiian people, regardless of
social or political status. What transpired subsequently, and the reasons for
it, will remain a source of study and debate for years to come.1 5 2 The
King's true reasons for enacting the Mahele in the first place, however,
were undoubtedly more complex than those proffered in the Bums article,
and certainly included as a "primary goal" the protection of the native
people's rights to 'aina. Indeed, John Papa 'I'T, a member of the Privy
Council and one of the first appointees of the Land Commission, praised
Kamehameha III because the division of lands in the Mdhele would be
permanent. 'I'T explained, "[i]t was said that he was the greatest of the
147 d
148 Id. at 722-23. The original Hawaiian, however, is in the Buke Mahele and is also
included in the Privy Council Records. BUKE MAHELE, supra note 114, at 225; Privy
Council Minutes ('Olelo Hawai'i), March 30, 1848, at 69,
http://punawaiola.org/KDA/browse/Kingdom/LinksKingdomExe.html.
149 BUKE MAHELE, supra note 114, at 225 (because few diacritical marks were used in
1848, they are not included in the text; however today this phrase would almost certainly be
transliterated as "po'e lahui kanaka" or "po'e lahui kanaka").
150 Indeed, the English translation of the entire last phrase of the second instrument may
be viewed as a matter of latent academic dispute. Justice Robertson gives no source for the
English translation. Kamehameha IV, 2 Haw. at 723.
151 KAME'ELEHIWA, supra note 5, at 207 (citation omitted) (translating "ko'u poe lahui
kanaka" in the Buke Mahele as "my Hawaiian people").
152 VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 372-73 (explaining that Maoli community leaders have
different perspectives on the claims of ali'i descendants and noting that this "process of
community involvement will require raising questions and promoting dialogue to address
not merely the Crown Lands but also other issues related to history, culture, and
sovereignty").
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kings, a royal parent who loved his Hawaiian people more than any other
chief before him."1 53
4. A collective memory of innovation and courage in the face of
adversity
Both the complex history of the institution of private property in Hawai'i,
as well as clues from the Buke Mahele and Privy Council records,
especially the original text in 'Olelo Hawai'i, tell a different story than
incomplete block quotes from cases that stand for different propositions.
The Bums article's attempt to reinvigorate a colonizer's tale of greedy
chiefs and lazy Hawaiians fails. By relying on limited and acontextual
fragments of selective case law, and ignoring the last forty years of
scholarship on Hawaiian history and the Mdhele, the Bums piece recounts a
parable of Native Hawaiians as ignorant and selfish. Instead, the
indigenous narrative imparts a collective memory of a people struggling to
retain their lands and sovereignty amidst mass death and political posturing
and an ali'i-Kamehameha III-innovative enough to marry western and
Native Hawaiian legal concepts with the hopes of preserving his nation's
heritage for his people.
Similar to the U.S. Supreme Court's majority in Rice v. Cayetano,154
which described the Mdhele as a "fundamental and historic division"
necessary for private ownership as westerners flocked to Hawai'i,155 Bums'
article glosses over the complexities and unintended consequences of that
process. Even the Rice majority acknowledged the loss of land by Kdnaka
Maoli in the Mdhele, but used racism to justify it, attributing that loss to
"improvidence and inability to finance farming operations" largely because
"Hawaiians are not business men and have shown themselves unable to
meet competitive conditions unaided."1 56 In much the same way, the Bums
essay unsuccessfully mischaracterizes and denigrates Kamehameha III's
motives for the Mdhele in an attempt to justify the seizure of the Crown
Lands.
Digging into the historical archives, as well as the "archives of [the
Kdnaka Maoli] mind, spirit, and culture" is vital to both uncover
Kamehameha III's actual intent behind the Mdhele and to reconstruct group
memories "within a context of not only rights norms but also larger societal
153 JOHN PAPA 'I'I, FRAGMENTS OF HAWAIIAN HISTORY 50 (Dorothy B. Barrere ed., Mary
Kawena Pukui trans., 1959).
154 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
155 Id. at 503.
156 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 839, at 6 (1920)).
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understandings of injustice and reparation." 57  These memories and
societal understandings are shaped by major events such as the Mdhele, and
our recounting of those critical junctures in Hawai'i's history "have the
potential to remake our, and society's, understandings of justice-for good
or ill.""5 It is therefore critical to elevate the indigenous narrative "for
constructing collective memories of injustice as a basis for redress" for
Native Hawaiians, and for the theft of the Crown Lands in particular.1 59 I
ka '61elo no ke ola, i ka '61elo no ka make.1 6 0
B. Separating the Crown Lands from the Native Hawaiian People
A second example of conflicting histories and worldviews is the Bums
article's basic premise that there is no explicit recognition, either in U.S. or
Hawai'i law, for any separate Native Hawaiian interest in the Crown
Lands.16' To bolster that argument, the article looks to the colonizer's
law-including the Joint Resolution of Annexation 62 and the Organic
Actl 63 -which facilitated the United States' appropriation of Hawai'i's
sovereignty and significant land holdings, in attempt to deny Native
Hawaiians any interest in the Crown Lands. In doing so, it ignores and
twists Native Hawaiian history and traditions, including the practice of
milama (to care for), attempts to downplay the significance of other legal
instruments that have already recognized a Native Hawaiian interest in the
Crown Lands, and misinterprets key concepts about native sovereignty.
This undermines the collective memory of the injustices committed against
Native Hawaiians by seeking to discredit the developing memory and
resurrect the old, inaccurate memory to undercut Native Hawaiian legal
claims to the Crown Lands.
157 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1764.
158 id.
159 id.
160 PUKUI, supra note 1, at 129 (translated here literally as "in the word there is life; in the
word there is death").
16 Burns, supra note 2, at 247-51.
162 Joint Resolution to Provide for Annexing the Hawaiian Islands to the United States,
July 7, 1898, H.R.J. Res. 55, 55th Cong., 30 Stat. 750 (1898) [hereinafter Joint Resolution of
Annexation].
163 Act to Provide a Government for the Territory of Hawaii, ch. 339, 31 Stat. 141 (1900)
[hereinafter Organic Act].
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1. The Burns article relies on the colonizer's laws-promulgated to
legitimize the theft ofHawaiian land-to attempt to undercut Native
Hawaiian claims to the Crown Lands
Bums is correct in that neither the 1898 Joint Resolution of Annexation
nor the 1900 Organic Act specifically identify Hawai'i's native people as
beneficiaries of the Crown or Government Lands. Instead, the Joint
Resolution declares:
The existing land laws of the United States relative to public lands shall not
apply to such land in the Hawaiian Islands . .. [p]rovided, [t]hat all revenue
from or proceeds of the same ... shall be used solely for the benefit of the
inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands for educational and other public
164purposes.
In turn, the 1900 Organic Act, which established the territorial
government, directly references the Joint Resolution of Annexation.
Section 73 of the Organic Act provides that the proceeds from the sale,
lease, or other disposition of the lands ceded by the Joint Resolution should
be deposited in the Territory's treasury for "such uses and purposes for the
benefit of the inhabitants of the Territory of Hawaii as are consistent with
the joint resolution of annexation[.]"1 65
Included in the "public lands" were not only the Government Lands of
the Hawaiian Kingdom, but also the Crown Lands. Indeed, the United
States specifically claimed the Crown Lands in the Organic Act, with
language asserting that:
the portion of the public domain heretofore known as Crown land is hereby
declared to have been, on the twelfth day of August, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight, and prior thereto, the property of the Hawaiian government, and
to be free and clear from any trust of or concerning the same, and from all
claim of any nature whatsoever, upon the rents, issues, and profits thereof. It
shall be subject to alienation and other uses as may be provided by law.166
164 Joint Resolution of Annexation, supra note 162 (emphasis added).
165 Organic Act, supra note 163, § 73(e), 31 Stat. at 154-55 (emphasis added). Note that
the Burns article, in citing provisions of the 1900 Organic Act, mistakenly includes sections
referencing the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, which was enacted in 1921, well after
the original Organic Act became law. See Bums, supra note 2, at 249-50. Undoubtedly, the
quoted language is from an amended version of the Organic Act, not the original version
passed in 1900. Compare id., with Organic Act, supra note 163.
166 Organic Act, supra note 163, § 99, 31 Stat. at 161. Section 99 mirrored article 95 of
the 1894 constitution of the republic claiming the Crown Lands as public lands and
disavowing any trust over or claims to those lands. Compare id., with REPUBLIC OF HAW.
CONST. of 1894, art. 95, reprinted in FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HAWAII, 201, 237 (Lorrin
Thurston ed., 1904).
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This language was nearly identical to article 95 of the 1894 Constitution of
the Republic of Hawai'i that originally confiscated the Crown Lands.1 67 As
one Native Hawaiian scholar has noted, the Republic's constitution
"manufactured a legal history for the Crown and Government lands."1 68
That manufactured history continued to hold sway as Queen
Lili'uokalani advanced her claims to the Crown Lands in the halls of the
U.S. Congress 6 9 and, finally, in the U.S. Court of Claims.17 0 None of her
attempts were successful and, eventually, the U.S. Court of Claims
determined that the Crown Lands belonged to the office of the Crown and
not to the individual monarchs.' 7 ' The court upheld the confiscation of the
Crown Lands and their eventual transfer to the United States by concluding:
The crown lands were the resourceful methods of income to sustain, in part at
least, the dignity of the office to which they were inseparably attached. When
the office ceased to exist they became as other lands of the Sovereignty and
passed to the defendants as part and parcel of the public domain.172
It is hardly surprising that neither the Joint Resolution of Annexation nor
the Organic Act specifically recognized Hawai'i's native people's interest
in the Crown Lands or any of the Kingdom's lands. Without the active
support of the U.S. minister to Hawai'i and the landing of U.S. naval forces,
a so-called Committee of Safety, representing American business interests,
would not have succeeded in supplanting the Queen's government and
establishing colonial rule.1 73  U.S. President Cleveland, after receiving a
167 REPUBLIC OF HAW. CONST. of 1894, art. 95, supra note 166.
168 Lindsey, supra note 12, at 251.
169 In 1903, the U.S. Senate passed an appropriation to settle Queen Lili'uokalani's claim
to the Crown Lands, but it failed to pass in the House of Representatives. S. 1553, 58th
Cong. (1903). On February 12 and 15, 1904, a similar bill was debated in the Senate and
failed passage by a tie vote of 26 to 26. H.R. 7094, 60th Cong. (1904).
170 Liliuokalani v. United States, 45 Ct. Cl. 418 (1910); see generally LILIUOKALANI,
HAWAII'S STORY BY HAWAII'S QUEEN (1898) (providing a native perspective and greater
context for pivotal events in Hawaiian history including the overthrow, annexation, and
claim to the Crown Lands); NEIL THOMAS PROTO, THE RIGHTS OF MY PEOPLE:
LILIUOKALANI'S ENDURING BATTLE WITH THE UNITED STATES 1893-1917 (2009) (detailing
the Queen's efforts to gain recognition and compensation from the United States for the
taking of the Crown Lands).
171 The court relied extensively on the earlier Hawai'i Supreme Court decision in In re
Kamehameha IV, 2 Haw. 715 (Haw. Kingdom 1864) and the Act of January 3, 1865. See
Liliuokalani, 45 Ct. Cl. at 426-28 (citing Kamehameha IV, 2 Haw. at 719, 722; Act of Jan.
3, 1865, 1 Haw. Sess. Laws 69 (1851-70)).
172 Id. at 428.
173 H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 47, 53D CONG., RELATING TO THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS (GROVER
CLEVELAND, DEC. 18, 1893) (2d Sess. 1893), reprinted in H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 1, 53D
CONG., APPENDIX II, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1894, AFFAIRS IN HAWAII
455-62 (3d Sess. 1895).
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report from Commissioner James Blount, whom he had sent to Hawai'i to
do a through investigation of the situation, determined that Americans, with
the support of the U.S. minister to Hawai'i and U.S. military troops, were
responsible for overthrowing the monarchy. In a forceful and moving
message to Congress, Cleveland advocated for the restoration of the
monarchy and proclaimed:
[I]f a feeble but friendly state is in danger of being robbed of its independence
and its sovereignty by a misuse of the name and power of the United States,
the United States can not fail to vindicate its honor and its sense of justice by
an earnest effort to make all possible reparation.1 74
Although President Cleveland recommended restoration of the Queen,
Congress did not take action and the annexationists in Hawai'i, realizing
that annexation would not be achieved while Cleveland was president,
formed the Republic of Hawai'i.17 5 The Republic's ability to take control
of the Crown Lands can be traced directly to the actions of the U.S.
government.176 By 1898, and the election of pro-annexationist William
McKinley as president, the United States had sufficiently distanced itself
from its complicity in overthrowing the Kingdom's legitimate government
and, sheltered by the five years between the overthrow and annexation, was
able to claim the Crown and Government Lands as well as sovereignty over
Hawai'i through the Joint Resolution of Annexation.1 77 Although U.S. law
acknowledged the trust nature of the Crown and Government Lands, it
could not acknowledge the actual beneficiaries of that trust-the Native
174 Id. at 457.
175 MacKenzie, supra note 5, at 23-25.
176 H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 47, supra note 173, at 455-62; Apology Resolution, supra note
18.
1 MacKenzie, supra note 5, at 25-27. In 1897, William McKinley, a Republican
sympathetic to the annexation of Hawai'i, was elected U.S. President and submitted a treaty
of annexation to the U.S. Senate. Id. Kanaka Maoli professor Noenoe Silva describes the
efforts by Kanaka Maoli, including mass meetings, petition drives, and sending
representatives to Washington, D.C., opposing annexation. See SILVA, supra note 10, at
157-59. The delegation to Washington was originally told that there were fifty-eight votes
in the Senate favoring the treaty of annexation, only a few votes shy of the votes needed for
passage. Id. By the time the delegation left Washington, however, there were only forty-six
votes on the pro-annexation side. Id. Failing passage of a treaty, in 1898, Congress passed a
Joint Resolution of Annexation that allegedly transferred the sovereignty and lands of
Hawai'i to the United States. Id. See generally Williamson B.C. Chang, Darkness Over
Hawaii: The Annexation Myth is the Greatest Obstacle to Progress, 16 ASIAN-PAC. L. &
POL'Y J. 70 (2015) (analyzing the annexation process and concluding that Hawai'i was not
validly annexed via the Joint Resolution of Annexation). See sources cited at note 217,
infra, for in-depth arguments of the possible legal effect of this Joint Resolution.
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Hawaiian people-from whom those lands were taken. Thus, both the Joint
Resolution and the Organic Act used the innocuous term "inhabitants." 7 8
The trust nature of the lands, and the relationship of Kanaka Maoli to
those lands was partially recognized in the Hawaiian Homes Commission
Act of 1920 (HHCA),1 79 which set aside approximately 203,500 acres for a
homesteading program for "native Hawaiians" of not less than fifty-percent
indigenous ancestry.8 o Similarly, in the 1959 Hawai'i Admission Act,
provisions explicitly protected lands and resources for "native Hawaiian"
beneficiaries as defined in the HHCA.' Section 5(f) of the 1959 Hawai'i
Admission Act declares that the "lands, proceeds, and income" from the
ceded lands trust "shall be managed and disposed offor one or more" of the
five trust purposes listed in section 5(f). 182 These trust purposes are:
178 The Hawaiian Commission, a five-member body established under the Joint
Resolution of Annexation to recommend legislation to Congress regarding Hawai'i, reported
that the population of Hawai'i in 1898 totaled 110,000 people. HAWAIIAN COMM'N, THE
REPORT OF THE HAWAIIAN COMM'N, APPOINTED IN PURSUANCE OF THE "JOINT RESOLUTION TO
PROVIDE FOR ANNEXING THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS TO THE UNITED STATES," APPROVED JULY 7,
1898, at 2-3 (1898). This number included 39,000 Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians
(approximately thirty-five percent of the population), 25,000 Japanese, 21,500 Chinese, and
15,000 Portuguese. Id. The report noted that about 700 Chinese had been naturalized but
most Chinese and Japanese were contract laborers who might be expected to return to their
home countries after their contracts expired. Id While it appeared that the Chinese were
likely to return to their native country, the Report noted that that was not so of the Japanese
who "frequently attain a position and standing in business which makes it desirable to them
to remain in the islands." Id. Notably, there were only 4,000 Americans in Hawai'i at the
time.
179 Pub. L. No. 67-34, 42 Stat. 108 (1921) [hereinafter HHCA].
"s See id. § 201(a)(7), 42 Stat. at 108 (defining "native Hawaiian"). The HHCA is set
out in full as amended as an appendix to the Hawai'i Revised Statutes. 15 MICHIE'S HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. 431-500 (2009). See Paul Nahoa Lucas, Alan T. Murakami & Avis
Kuuipoleialoha Poai, Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, in NATIVE HAWAIIAN LAW, supra
note 5, at 176, 176-227, for an in-depth discussion of the HHCA and the homesteading
program. See Section III.C.1, infra, for discussion on the racist history and divisiveness of
the "native Hawaiian" definition in the HHCA.
181 Hawaii Admission Act, Pub. L. No. 86-3, §§ 4-5, 73 Stat. 4, 5-6 (1959) [hereinafter
Admission Act].
182 Id. § 5(f), 73 Stat. at 6 (emphasis added). The Burns article suggests that Professor
Van Dyke ignored the section 5(f) language requiring trust resources to go to "one or more"
of the five trust purposes pointing to language on pages 257-58 of the Crown Lands book
for this proposition. Burns, supra note 2, at 258. On the very next page of the Crown Lands
book, however, Professor Van Dyke discusses the State of Hawai'i's interpretation of the
section 5(f) language, and the State's position that the revenues could be used for any one of
the five trust purposes, although the revenues had never been allocated to benefit the Kinaka
Maoli community. VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 259. Thus, Professor Van Dyke was keenly
aware of the trust language in the Admission Act. See id. Moreover, the passage quoted by
Judge Burns is only one instance in which Professor Van Dyke analyzed the Admission Act.
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[T]he support of the public schools and other public educational institutions,
for the betterment of the conditions of native Hawaiians, as defined in the
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, as amended, for the development of
farm and home ownership on as widespread a basis as possible[,] for the
making of public improvements, and for the provision of lands for public
183
use.
Although they acknowledge the interest of the Native Hawaiian
community in the Crown and Government Lands of the Kingdom, both the
HHCA and the Admission Act attempt to limit the trust beneficiaries-to
those of not less than fifty-percent Hawaiian blood quantum-and the trust
interest to "one or more" of five trust purposes. Like the Joint Resolution
of Annexation and the Organic Act, these laws rely on a manufactured
history of the lands and a collective memory that glosses over the illegal
transfer of the Kingdom's lands and sovereignty to the United States.' 84
In the chapter of his book discussing the Rice v. Cayetano case, Professor Van Dyke
specifically noted that section 5(f) of the Admission Act contains language providing that
the State must use trust resources for "one or more" of the five trust purposes. Id. at 303
(discussing Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000)). It is apparent from a reading of that
chapter that Professor Van Dyke was well versed on the specific language of section 5(f).
See id.
183 Admission Act, supra note 181, § 5(f) (emphasis added).
184 This history would be incomplete without also acknowledging reconciliation efforts
by the people of Hawai'i, who voted to enact constitutional amendments more clearly and
specifically setting out the State's responsibilities to the Native Hawaiian community under
the public land trust. Thus, article XII, section 4 of the State Constitution now designates
"native Hawaiians" and members of the general public as the two beneficiaries of the
majority of the lands in the "public land trust." HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 4. Other
amendments established the Office of Hawaiian Affairs (OHA) and tasked the OHA trustees
with managing and administering a pro rata share of the revenue from the public land trust
"for native Hawaiians." HAW. CONST. art. XII, §§ 5-6. The definition of "native
Hawaiians" in these amendments is tied to the fifty-percent Hawaiian blood quantum of the
HHCA, as required by federal law. Admission Act, supra note 181, § 5(f). Thus, the State
has acknowledged and is attempting to fulfill its responsibilities to a portion of the Kanaka
Maoli community by mandating that a portion of the public land trust funds go toward that
purpose.
More recently, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has held that a Native Hawaiian member
of the general public who is less than fifty-percent Hawaiian can bring suit to enforce the
provisions of the public land trust. Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. Hous. & Cmty. Dev.
Corp., 121 Hawai'i 324, 326, 219 P.3d 1111, 1113 (2009). In a challenge to the State's
attempt to sell portions of the trust, the court held that the plaintiff, as a Native Hawaiian and
a member of the general public, might be injured by the loss of trust lands. Id The Hawai'i
Supreme Court, in a ruling consistent with its understanding of the relationship between the
Native Hawaiian people and the 'aina, believed that the plaintiff could suffer cultural and
religious injury if the lands were transferred in violation of the State's trust responsibility.
Id. at 335, 219 P.3d at 1121.
Finally, both the federal and state courts have also recognized that funds derived from
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The plain language of the colonizer's laws that the Bums article relies
on-the Joint Resolution of Annexation and Organic Act-reflects the fact
that they were specifically crafted to legitimize the theft of Native Hawaiian
land and sovereignty. When one considers the United States' role in the
illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom and seizure of the Crown
Lands-as Professor Van Dyke did in his book-a collective memory of
injustice emerges. That memory "implicates power and culture" and
becomes "hotly contested by those ... opposing justice claims."1 5  After
all, if Kdnaka Maoli claims to the Crown Lands are respected, that would
mean fewer resources for competing interests that have currently been
benefitting from the wrongful appropriation of indigenous assets. Sadly,
when individuals, including Professor Van Dyke "persuasively reconstruct
historical injustice they usually face fierce opposition by those in power.
That opposition seeks totally to discredit the developing memory. . . . [o]r,
alternatively, it seeks to partially transform the old memory ... into a new
memory." 8 6 Purposefully or not, the Bums article's hollow claim that the
Native Hawaiian people have no separate interest in the Crown Lands falls
into that pattern of seeking to transform an old, erroneous memory into a
new one, which necessitated this response. I ka '61elo no ke ola, i ka '61elo
no ka make.1 7
the public land trust and provided to OHA can be utilized for any of the trust purposes set
forth in section 5(f) of the Admission Act as long as the "native Hawaiian" beneficiaries are
served. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that "[a]lthough the [OHA] trustees
are obliged to spend only for trust purposes, they have broad discretion to decide how to
serve those purposes." Day v. Apoliona, 616 F.3d 918, 926 (9th Cir. 2010). Similarly, the
Hawai'i Supreme Court has held that "an expenditure [by the OHA Trustees] that betters the
conditions of native Hawaiians [of at least 50 percent Hawaiian ancestry] may also
simultaneously benefit the conditions of others." Kealoha v. Machado, 131 Hawai'i 62, 78,
315 P.3d 213, 229 (2013); see Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie, The Public Land Trust, in
NATIVE HAWAIIAN LAW, supra note 5, at 105-11 (analyzing the State's trust duties in
utilizing public land trust revenues).
The Crown Lands are the 'aina of Hawai'i's indigenous people both as descendants
and heirs of the Hawaiian Kingdom. The people of Hawai'i, through constitutional
amendments and legislative action, have acknowledged that legacy and, to a limited extent,
have sought reconciliation to provide some measure of redress to Hawai'i's native people.
Even the decisions of the Hawai'i Supreme Court have valued and appreciated the deep
connection between Kanaka Maoli and 'aina as well as the impact of the loss of 'aina and
sovereignty to Native Hawaiians. See generally Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie, Ke Ala
Loa: The Path of Justice: The Moon Court's Native Hawaiian Rights Decisions, 33 U.
HAW. L. REV. 447 (2011) (discussing Hawai'i Supreme Court decisions during the tenure of
Chief Justice Ronald Moon impacting the Native Hawaiian community).
185 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1765.
186 Id.
18 PUKUI, supra note 1, at 129 (translated here literally as "in the word there is life; in the
word there is death").
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2. Native Hawaiian tradition, including the duty of ali'i to mdlama,
must inform claims to and management of the Crown Lands
The indigenous narrative-which the Bums article ignores-also
provides vital insight into Kanaka Maoli traditions, including tenets of land
stewardship, which provide a foundation for legal claims to the Crown
Lands. As one Native Hawaiian scholar explained, "[t]he trust established
under Kingdom law was meant to ensure that Native Hawaiians would
always have a means to provide for their own self-determination."' 88
Native Hawaiian interests in the Crown Lands, as well as the Government
Lands, do not arise merely from the specific language in the Joint
Resolution of Annexation, the Organic Act, the HHCA, or the Admission
Act. "Native Hawaiian rights in those lands derive from Native tradition
and the law of the Kingdom of Hawai'i."18 9
The concept of a "trust" is deeply rooted in Kanaka Maoli tradition, one
that ensures that ali'i cared for the native people, a tradition consistently
honored by many ali'i.' 90 Indeed, one of Queen Lili'uokalani's first acts
after taking the throne was to direct the Crown Lands Commissioner to set
aside Crown Lands in ten-acre lots for homesteading, primarily for Native
Hawaiians.' 9' This trust concept, one that calls upon the ali'i to malama or
care for their people, is embodied today by the Ali'i trusts:1 92
These trusts reflect the reciprocal duties of the ali'i and the maka'ainana
(common people). Traditionally, the maka'ainana had the duty to care for the
land, and wise management of the people and land enhanced the right of the
ali'i to rule. Productive use of the land and mutual cooperation ensured the
right of the maka'ainana to live off the land and use its resources. Although
the traditional social structure was dramatically altered through the creation of
private property rights . . . the creation of these trusts suggests that the ali'i
continued to understand and attempted to fulfill their obligation to provide for
the needs of their people.193
Upon her death in 1884, Ke Ali'i Bernice Pauahi Bishop's lands,
approximately 378,000 acres, were placed in trust to establish the
188 Lindsey, supra note 12, at 257.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 250.
191 HELENA G. ALLEN, THE BETRAYAL OF LILIUOKALANI, LAST QUEEN OF HAWAII
1838-1917, at 259 (1982) (citing notes of THOMAS G. THRUM, HAWAIIAN ALMANAC AND
ANNUAL (1874-1917)).
192 See generally Avis Kuuipoleialoha Poai & Susan K. Serrano, Ali'i Trusts: Native
Hawaiian Charitable Trusts, in NATIVE HAWAIIAN LAW, supra note 5, at 1171 (discussing
the establishment, challenges, and current status of the various Ali'i trusts).
193 Id. (footnotes omitted).
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Kamehameha Schools, giving preference in admission to Native Hawaiian
children.1 94  King William Charles Lunalilo, who reigned from 1873 to
1874, left his private lands in trust for the care of elderly Native
Hawaiians.1 9 5 Queen Emma, wife of Kamehameha IV, placed the bulk of
her estate in trust for the benefit of the Queen's Hospital, which offered
medical care to Native Hawaiians.196 Queen Lili'uokalani herself left most
of her land in trust for the benefit of orphans and indigent Native Hawaiian
children.1 97  Similarly, King David Kalakaua and his wife, Queen
Kapi'olani, as part of their ho'oulu lhui effort,'9 8 founded the Kapi'olani
Maternity Home to ensure that Hawaiian women would have help in giving
birth and in nurturing their babies.' 99 In this way, an important legacy of
Native Hawaiian ali'i has been to 'auamo (take on) their kuleana (sacred
responsibility and privilege) of caring for Hawai'i's native people and
resources and continuing those efforts 5 mau loa (forever).
3. Other legal instruments have recognized that Native Hawaiians
have legal claims to the Crown Lands
The U.S. Congress through the 1993 Apology Resolution,200 as well as
the Hawai'i Supreme Court in the landmark Office of Hawaiian Affairs v.
Housing Community and Development Corp. decision,20' have clearly
recognized that the Native Hawaiian people, without regard to the fifty-
percent blood quantum requirement, have claims to both the Crown and the
Government Lands of the Hawaiian Kingdom.202 The Burns article sought
to downplay and dismiss the language in the Apology Resolution and
194 Id at 1172-73.
195 Id at 1203.
196 Id at 1206.
197 Id at 1196.
198 Ho'oulu lahui was an organization founded by King Kalakaua to minister to sick
Native Hawaiians and provide them with support and healthcare. Constitution & By-laws of
the Ahahui Hooulu a Hoola Society, February 19, 1874, at 4, 6-8 (1888); LILIUOKALANI,
supra note 170, at 111-13.
199 LILIUOKALANI, supra note 170, at 111-13. The maternity home became Kapi'olani
Maternity Hospital and in 1978, merged with Kauikeolani Children's Hospital to become
Kapi'olani Medical Center for Women and Children.
200 Apology Resolution, supra note 18.
201 117 Hawai'i 174, 177 P.3d 884 (2008).
202 See Apology Resolution, supra note 18, pmbl., 107 Stat. at 1512 ("Whereas the
Republic of Hawaii also ceded 1,800,000 acres of crown, government and public lands of
the Kingdom of Hawaii, without the consent of or compensation to the Native Hawaiian
people of Hawaii or their sovereign government[.]").
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neglected even to address the Hawai'i Supreme Court's interpretation of
that federal legislation.203
Although the U.S. Supreme Court in Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian
Affairs 204 held that the Apology Resolution did not change substantive
law,205 the Court did not refute the findings of either the U.S. Congress or
the Hawai'i Supreme Court.206 As the Bums article correctly asserts, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that the Apology Resolution was merely
conciliatory and had no operative effect and that its findings, which provide
the factual basis for the apology, did not substantively alter the State's
obligations.2 07 Indeed, the Court noted that giving effect to the Resolution's
whereas clauses "would raise grave constitutional concerns."20 8
Nevertheless, the declaration by the U.S. Congress and Executive that the
overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawai'i involved the "participation of agents
and citizens of the United States" and resulted in the "deprivation of the
rights of Native Hawaiians to self-determination" is a powerful
209
admission. Moreover, under U.S. law, a joint resolution such as the
Apology Resolution that has gone through the full legislative process,
including committee consideration and floor debate, has the same force as
210
any other legislation passed by Congress.
The Hawai'i Supreme Court's distillation of Native Hawaiians' trust
lands and claims, as set forth in the Apology Resolution, stand in sharp
contrast to those of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Hawai'i Supreme Court,
giving full effect to the Apology Resolution's findings, reasoned that they
gave rise to the State's fiduciary duty to preserve trust lands until Kdnaka
Maoli claims are resolved. Relying upon earlier cases establishing the
203 Bums, supra note 2, at 251. Burns also briefly discussed two other sources that he
asserts do not support Professor Van Dyke's overarching thesis. These two sources are a
June 24, 1982 Letter from State of Hawai'i Deputy Attorney General William Tam, and a
Wall Street Journal article. Id. at 254-55 (citing Letter from William Tam, Att'y Gen., State
of Haw., to Susumu Ono, Chair, Haw. Bd. of Land & Nat. Res. (June 24, 1982) (on file with
authors) [hereinafter Tam Letter]; The Prince's Plan is Co-Opted, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9,
1991, at A4). As Bums notes, the Wall Street Journal article contained the reporter's own
interpretation of law. Id. at 255 (citing The Prince's Plan is Co-Opted, supra, at A4)). The
Tam Letter, however, does reference the indigenous population, but it is unclear whether
Tam used "indigenous" to mean the first peoples of the land or the local population. Tam
Letter, supra, at 5.
204 556 U.S. 163 (2009).
205 Id. at 173-76.
206 See id.
207 Bums, supra note 2, at 251-52 (citing Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. at 175).
208 Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. at 176.
209 Apology Resolution, supra note 18, § 1(3), 107 Stat. at 1513.
210 See, e.g., Ann Arbor R. Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 658, 666 (1930) (treating a
joint resolution just as any other legislation enacted by the U.S. Congress).
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State's trust duties,21 ' the court opined, "such duty is consistent with the
State's 'obligation to use reasonable skill and care' in managing the public
lands trust" and the State's conduct should be judged "by the most exacting
fiduciary standards."212 The Hawai'i Supreme Court examined both the
legal and equitable issues involved, seeking to strike a balance. Although it
did not rule on Native Hawaiians' ultimate claims, the court sought to
protect the trust lands until a political resolution could be achieved. 2 13
The irony here is that the Apology Resolution is a joint resolution of the
U.S. Congress, which the Bums article dismisses as "no more than the
personal opinions of those who voted for it or approved it." 2 14 Should not
then the 1898 Joint Resolution of Annexation also be viewed with similar
suspicion? Indeed, while the piece assumes the validity of the Joint
Resolution of Annexation,2 15 questions about the legitimacy of U.S.
acquisition of Hawai'i through such a resolution, instead of a treaty, were
raised and actively debated in Congress in 1898.216 The ineffectiveness of
such a resolution to transfer Hawai'i's sovereignty and lands to the United
States is the subject of ongoing comment and criticism and underpins the
modem Hawaiian independence movement.2 17
The Bums article also misinterprets the Apology Resolution's use of
"inherent sovereignty" as a term solely applied to the sovereignty of native
211 See Ahuna v. Dep't of Hawaiian Home Lands, 64 Haw. 327, 340, 640 P.2d 1161,
1169 (1982); Pele Def. Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 601, 837 P.2d 1247, 1262 (1992).
212 Office of Hawaiian Affairs v. HCDCH I, 117 Hawai'i 174, 195, 177 P.3d 884, 905
(2008) (quoting Ahuna, 64 Haw. at 339, 640 P.2d at 1169).
213 Id. at 192, 177 P.3d at 902; see MacKenzie, Ke Ala Loa, supra note 184, at 489-502
(examining the Hawai'i Supreme Court's decision related to the Apology Resolution).
214 Burns, supra note 2, at 251.
215 Id. at 249-51.
216 Professor Chang notes that the best source showing American opposition in 1898 to
annexation can be found in the Senate Debates on annexation. Chang, supra note 177, at 72
n.5 (citing to 31 CONG. REc. 6141-6710 (1898)). See generally THOMAS J. OSBORNE,
ANNEXATION HAWAII: FIGHTING AMERICAN IMPERIALISM (1998) (providing overview and
analysis of annexation process).
217 See generally, Chang, supra note 177 (analyzing the arguments against annexation by
a joint resolution and detailing the current Hawaiian sovereignty initiatives based on the
illegal annexation doctrine); David Keanu Sai, A Slippery Path Towards Hawaiian
Indigeneity: An Analysis and Comparison Between Hawaiian State Sovereignty and
Hawaiian Indigeneity and Its Use and Practice in Hawai'i Today, 10 J.L. & Soc.
CHALLENGES 68, 84-90 (2008) (arguing that an independent nation state such as Hawai'i
could not be annexed by a joint resolution but only by treaty); David Keanu Sai, The
American Occupation of the Hawaiian Kingdom: Beginning the Transition from Occupied
to Restored State (Dec. 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Hawai'i at
Manoa) (on file at Hamilton Library, University of Hawai'i at Manoa) (analyzing the
process of annexation and asserting that Hawai'i is an occupied state).
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nations and tribal governments within the United States.218 "Inherent
sovereignty" has been used most frequently in U.S. law to characterize the
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes-both to
support the tribes' retained "inherent sovereign powers" as well as to
validate the United States' exercise of authority over native peoples, lands,
and resources. 21 9  There are obvious concerns with the Bums article's
characterization of the complicated history of federal Indian law based on
language from one selected case, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and
220Bands of Yakima Indian Nation,20 to describe what he deemed "the
relevant history of the relationship between the United States and the Indian
Tribes." 2 2 ' The histories and relationships between recognized indigenous
218 Bums, supra note 2, at 252.
219 Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and
the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1,
1-15, 29-42 (2002).
220 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
221 Bums, supra note 2, at 253 (citing Brendale, 492 U.S. at 425). The seventy-word
"relevant history" reads:
Prior to the European settlement of the New World, Indian tribes were "self-governing
sovereign political communities," and they still retain some "elements of 'quasi-
sovereign' authority after ceding their lands to the United States and announcing their
dependence on the Federal Government."
Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting Brendale, 492 U.S. at 425). A tribe's inherent
sovereignty, however, is divested to the extent it is inconsistent with the tribe's dependent
status, that is, to the extent it involves a tribe's "external relations." Brendale, 492 U.S. at
427 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978) and Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978)).
Although Brendale is an inappropriate case to cite for the so-called "relevant history,"
Judge Burns' use of Brendale does highlight the complexities of federal Indian law.
Professor Matthew Fletcher explained that in Brendale, "[t]he sharply divided Court did not
issue a majority opinion." MATTHEw L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 369 (2016).
While Brendale was a 1978 Supreme Court case, it invoked long-out-of-date federal policies
from the 1800s that were abandoned by 1934; Indian policies continued to change in the
remainder of the twentieth century. See generally id. at 51-115. Brendale dealt with civil
regulatory jurisdiction issues over lands that were geographically within a tribe's present-
day reservation boundaries but had ceased to be tribal lands because of allotment (which
emanates from the General Allotment Act, Act of Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388) and were no
longer owned by tribal members. 492 U.S. at 422. The federal government's allotment
policy turned tribally held reservation lands into individual parcels of privately-owned lands
to tribal members while any surplus parcels were sold to non-Indian non-tribal members "on
the open market." FLETCHER, supra, at 70.
Just as a summarized "relevant history" involving shifting policies and actions
spanning nearly three centuries requires more than the mere seventy words relied upon in the
Burns article, so too does a meaningful but general discussion of Brendale. The Court relied
on a record that acknowledged "open" and "closed" areas within the reservation boundaries.
Brendale, 492 U.S. at 415-16. An "open" area referred to areas that contained "allotted"
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governments and the United States are too complex to rely on a mere
seventy words from a single court decision. U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Clarence Thomas indicated how complex the histories and relationships are
(or at the least how confused he is) when he wrote, "Federal Indian policy
is, to say the least, schizophrenic. And this confusion continues to infuse
federal Indian law and our cases."222
Inherent sovereignty also describes the sovereignty of an independent
nation, such as the Hawaiian Kingdom prior to its illegal overthrow.
Professor Sarah H. Cleveland's article on how this doctrine is utilized by
the U.S. Supreme Court details its international law origins:
[A]il nations possessed certain powers inherent in their existence as nations.
These powers were defined, shared, and recognized by all members of the
family of nations and were essential to a nation's identity as an independent
state. Sovereign powers were not subject to any external or positive
constraints, save the rights of other sovereigns under international law, and
any effort to limit these powers would undermine the nation's independence
and equal status in the inter-national community.223
The Apology Resolution does not specify whether "inherent sovereignty"
signifies U.S. domestic law or international law. Since, however, the
Resolution is an apology to the Native Hawaiian people for the U.S. role in
the overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, which was a recognized
independent nation and a member of the family of nations in 1893, it stands
to reason that the "inherent sovereignty as a people" referenced in the
Apology Resolution, especially when coupled with a claim to "national
lands" means the inherent sovereignty of the people of a nation state.
parcels while the "closed" area "had been closed to the general public" and the "Bureau of
Indian Affairs restricted the use of... the [closed] area to" tribal members and the tribe's
permittees. Id. at 415. In its plurality opinion, the Court recognized the tribal government's
authority to "regulate nonmember land use ... in [closed] areas ... but [the tribal
government] may not enforce zoning ordinances on nonmembers in [open] areas[.]"
FLETCHER, supra, at 369.
222 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 219 (2004).
223 Cleveland, supra note 219, at 15 (citing 2 EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS
§ 54, at 154 (Joseph Chitty ed., T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1876) (1758)). Professor
Cleveland also notes that "Nineteenth century publicists who examined the international law
nature of sovereignty include HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (James
Brown Scott ed., 1866), and HENRY W. HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW; OR RULES
REGULATING THE INTERCOURSE OF STATES IN PEACE AND WAR (1861)." Id. at 15 n.56.
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4. Native Hawaiian narratives impart invaluable insight into
Hawai'i's culture, history, and legal claims
Yet again, the Bums article ignores Kdnaka Maoli culture and traditions,
especially the practice of milama, in an attempt to deny claims to the
Crown Lands. Instead, the piece relies on the colonizer's laws-literally,
the very instruments used to facilitate the United States' grab of Native
Hawaiian land and sovereignty-as a basis for trying to minimize the
claims of Hawai'i's indigenous people. In doing so, the essay elevates the
colonizer's narrative and takes issue with the collective memory of injustice
that Professor Van Dyke and even the U.S. Congress actively constructed
regarding the harms imposed on Kdnaka Maoli as a result of colonization.
For example, the Bums article refutes the Apology Resolution's concession
that the 1893 overthrow "resulted in the suppression of the inherent
sovereignty of the Native Hawaiian people." 2 24 Instead, the piece claims
that Hawaiian sovereignty was not suppressed because Native Hawaiians
lost control of their kingdom prior to the overthrow "[a]s a result of the
decision and indecision and actions and inactions of the Hawaiian
ali'i[. ]"225
This narrow-minded refrain is reminiscent of the U.S. Supreme Court's
226
majority opinion in Rice v. Cayetano, which described the 1893
American overthrow as "justified by Queen Lili'uokalani's undemocratic
actions. Her attempt to restore 'monarchical control ... and limit[] the
franchise to Hawaiian subjects compelled prodemocracy Americans to seize
control." 22 7 Like the Bums essay, the Rice majority attempted to blame an
illegal act of war and the seizure of Native Hawaiian resources on the
Queen's supposed shortcomings.228 Fortunately, the Kdnaka Maoli
narrative, especially the legacy of Native Hawaiian ali'i and their trusts,
demonstrates continued kuleana for Hawai'i's indigenous people and
resources into the present.
Both the Bums article and the Rice majority "twist a history of white
229
racial dominance into a justification" for their legal arguments. "[B]y
narrowly framing history to legitimate its decision, the Supreme Court
generated precedent for forthcoming cases that undermines the principle of
224 Burns, supra note 2, at 253 (quoting the Apology Resolution, supra note 18); see also
Osorio & Beamer, supra note 8, at 472 (dismantling the Burns article's claims that the
overthrow was the fault of Hawaiian ali'i).
225 Burns, supra note 2, at 253.
226 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
227 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1774 (quoting Rice, 528 U.S. at 504).
228 Rice, 528 U.S. at 504-05.
229 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1777.
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justice through reparation." 23 0 This significant threat to Native Hawaiian
people and claims underscores both the need to set the record straight with
respect to the Crown Lands as well as the "strategic import of collective
memory for justice claims processed through the U.S. legal system[.]" 231
ka '61elo no ke ola, i ka '61elo no ka make.232
C. Defining and Dividing Kinaka
The Bums article opens its critique of Professor Van Dyke's book by
devoting several pages to definitions and legal uses of the terms
"Hawaiian," "Native Hawaiian," and "native Hawaiian." 233  The article
utilizes the divisive definition set forth in section 10-2 of the Hawai'i
Revised Statutes and criticizes Professor Van Dyke's use of a term that
includes all of Hawai'i's native people irrespective of blood quantum.234 A
seemingly trivial point, this issue epitomizes how the piece's parochial
focus ignores both the larger context of Native Hawaiian law and history,
while also resurrecting an instrument that has been used to divide Hawai'i's
indigenous people and limit benefits.
In doing so, the article misses a crucial point-one that Professor Van
Dyke deeply understood 2 35-that legal definitions do not, and indeed
cannot, encompass the rich culture, history, or essence of a people; or, most
importantly, how a people identify themselves. Preeminent Native
Hawaiian scholar and Ethnic Studies professor Davianna Pomaika'i
McGregor has explained the native perspective:
The Hawaiian people are the living descendants of Papa, the earth mother,
and Wakea, the sky father. They also trace their origins through Kane of the
living waters found in streams and springs; Lono of the winter rains and the
life force for agricultural crops; Kanaloa of the deep foundation of the earth,
the ocean and its currents and winds; Ku of the thunder, war, fishing and
planting; Pele of the volcano; and thousands of deities of the forest, the ocean,
the winds, the rains and the various other elements of nature. . . . This unity of
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 PUKUI, supra note 1, at 129 (translated here literally as "in the word there is life; in the
word there is death").
233 Burns, supra note 2, at 214-17.
234 Id. As detailed in Section III.C.1, infra, this definition originated in the Hawaiian
Homes Commission Act of 1920, Pub. L. No. 67-34, 42 Stat. 108 (1921).
235 VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 1; see also Jon M. Van Dyke, The Political Status of the
Native Hawaiian People, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 95 (1998).
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humans, nature and the gods formed the core of the Hawaiian people's
philosophy, world view and spiritual belief system.23 6
This interconnected relationship between nature, land, and Kinaka Maoli
is also captured in an '61elo no'eau, or indigenous proverb, "Hanau ka
'aina, hanau ke ali'i, hanau ke kanaka. Born was the land, born were the
chiefs, born were the common people." 23 7  This adage reflects the
indigenous creation story and belief that "[t]he land, the chiefs, and the
commoners belong together[,]" 23 8 which contributes to a collective memory
of Native Hawaiians as an inclusive nation united by their familial bond to
their sacred lands and to each other.
1. The history and legal significance of the capital N in "Native
Hawaiian"
For too long, the law has sought to define and divide Native Hawaiians,
usually by descent from an ancestor in Hawai'i prior to 1778,239 and
sometimes with a blood quantum requirement, in various ways and for a
myriad of purposes. As the Bums article demonstrates, the ways in which
the law defines Native Hawaiians impacts how the law is applied and what
legal rights to lands and resources flow from those definitions. 24 0 The piece
criticizes Professor Van Dyke's use of the broad term Native Hawaiian in
his Crown Lands book to include all those of Hawaiian ancestry. 24 1
Ironically, in making his critique, Bums constricts the legal definitions of,
and conflates distinctions among, the terms "Hawaiian," "Native
Hawaiian," and "native Hawaiian" as used in law.242
After pointing out that Queen Lili'uokalani differentiated between
"native" and "part native" and that the Hawai'i State Constitution uses both
"native Hawaiians" and "Hawaiians," the Bums article reviewed five
236 McGregor, The Cultural and Political History ofHawaiian Native People, supra note
116, at 335-36 ('O1elo Hawai'i diacritical marks added).
237 PUKUI, supra note 1, at 56.
238 id.
239 The year 1778 is the year of documented contact between Native Hawaiians and
Europeans. See THE VOYAGES OF CAPTAIN JAMES COOK ROUND THE WORLD: SELECTED
FROM HIS JOURNALS 308-10 (Christopher Lloyd ed., 1949). See generally DAVID E.
STANNARD, BEFORE THE HORROR: THE POPULATION OF HAWAII ON THE EVE OF WESTERN
CONTACT (1989) (arguing that previous estimates of the number of people in Hawai'i prior
to 1778 have been severely flawed and underestimate the population by at least fifty
percent).
240 Burns, supra note 2, at 214-17.
241 Id. at 214-15, 217.
242 Id. at 214-17.
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statutes. 3  Of those five, the article states that three define a "native
Hawaiian" as "any descendant of not less than one-half part of the blood of
the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778.",244 Ultimately,
it alleges that Professor Van Dyke conflated the two terms in his analysis of
the status of the Crown Lands Trust.24 5 Professor Van Dyke, however, was
careful to specifically note those instances when statutes referred to a fifty-
percent Hawaiian blood quantum requirement.246  Moreover, Judge Bums
himself appears not to have realized that the statutes that use the fifty-
percent blood quantum definition use a lower case "n" in native
Hawaiian.2 47 This is an important distinction, because statutes that use the
capital "N" Native Hawaiians utilize a definition based on descent from a
pre-1778 native of Hawai'i, whereas lower case "n" native Hawaiians are
defined in terms of blood quantum.
While it is true that of the five statutes listed in the Bums piece, three
define "native Hawaiians" as those of at least fifty-percent Hawaiian
ancestry, there are many more statutes that define or recognize "Native
Hawaiians" as those whose ancestors were natives of the Hawaiian Islands
prior to 1778, without regard to blood quantum. Beginning in 1974 with
the passage of the Native American Programs Act, all major federal
legislation that defines "Native Hawaiian" does so based on descent from
243 Id. at 215-17.
244 Id. at 215 (citations omitted).
245 Id. at 217.
246 See, e.g., VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 1 n.1, 237 n.2, 258, 280-81, 381.
247 Ironically, in the statutes cited in the Burns article, only a lower case "native"
Hawaiian is defined using the fifty-percent blood quantum standard. This can be confusing.
For instance, the plain text of the "native Hawaiian" definition in section 10-2 of the Hawai'i
Revised Statutes capitalizes the word "Native." When referring to the definition of
"beneficiary of the public trust entrusted upon the office" earlier in the same statute,
however, it is evident that the capitalization of the "N" in that definition of "native
Hawaiian" is due to the word being placed at the beginning of the sentence. See HAw. REv.
STAT. § 10-2 (2016). The definition section in the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of
1920, as set forth in the Hawai'i Revised Statutes, also places the word "native" at the
beginning of a sentence, thus capitalizing it, but where the term occurs elsewhere in that
statute, "native" is not capitalized. Compare HHCA § 201(a), 15 MICHIE'S HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN., supra note 180, at 435 ("When used in this title: ..... Native Hawaiian' means any
descendant of not less than one-half part of the blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian
Islands previous to 1778."), with HHCA §§ 201.5, 204(a)(2), 207(a), 15 MICHIE'S HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN., supra note 180, at 436, 454-55, 461. But in the corresponding definitions
section of the federally promulgated version of the Act, the word "native" does not appear at
the beginning of the sentence, and is not capitalized. See HHCA, supra note 179, §
201(a)(7), 42 Stat. at 108 ("The term "native Hawaiian" means any descendant of not less
than one-half part of the blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to
1778.").
528
2017 / A COLLECTIVE MEMORY OF INJUSTICE
pre-1778 peoples. 248 Thus, of the more than 150 laws the U.S. Congress
has approved that mention or recognize Native Hawaiians, relatively few
utilize the fifty-percent blood quantum definition and those statutes utilize
the small "n" native Hawaiian that the Bums article employed.249
The fifty-percent blood quantum definition itself was first used in the
1920 Hawaiian Homes Commission Act (HHCA) passed by the U.S.
Congress.250 A chapter of the Crown Lands book details the HHCA's
background and history. 25 ' As Professor Van Dyke and many others have
pointed out, the initial proposals advocated by Native Hawaiian leaders
contained no minimum indigenous blood quantum.252 Eventually, to gain
the support of the sugar and ranching interests that controlled Hawai'i's
economy and to ensure the passage of a homesteading bill, several
compromises were made, including the fifty-percent Hawaiian blood
253quantum requirement. Van Dyke explained that those who pressed for
this high blood quantum "hoped that, with the rapid decline of the Hawaiian
population, the program could be phased out and the lands could be
248 See, e.g., Native American Programs Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-644, §§ 802-03, 88
Stat. 2291, 2324-25 (1975) (promoting Native Hawaiian, American Indian, and Alaska
Native economic and social self-sufficiency through financial assistance to indigenous-
serving programs); Native Hawaiian Health Care Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-579, § 8(3),
102 Stat. 2916, 2920 (1988) (definition codified at 42 U.S.C. § 11711(3)); Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-601, § 2(10), 104 Stat.
3048, 3049 (1990) (definition codified at 25 U.S.C. § 3001(10)); Native Hawaiian Education
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 7207(1), 115 Stat. 1425, 1942 (2002) (definition
codified at 20 U.S.C § 7517(2)). As recently as 2014, Congress passed an Act relating to
Historic Preservation and the National Park Service that uses this descent-based pre-1778
definition of "Native Hawaiian." Act of Dec. 19, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-287, § 300313, 128
Stat. 3094, 3190 (2014) (definition codified at 54 U.S.C. § 300313).
249 See, e.g., HHCA, supra note 179, § 201(7), 42 Stat. at 108; Act of June 20, 1938, Pub.
L. No. 75-680, § 3(a), 52 Stat. 781, 784 (1938); Admission Act, supra note 181, §§ 4-5, 73
Stat. at 5-6; Hawaiian Home Lands Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 104-42, § 202(2), 109 Stat.
353, 357 (1995) (defining "beneficiary" as used in the act as having the same definition as
"native Hawaiian" under section 201(7) of the HHCA).
250 VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 1 n. 1 (noting that the HHCA was the first federal statute
establishing a program for Native Hawaiians), 246-47 (explaining the fifty-percent blood
quantum restriction in the bill as enacted); see also Lucas, Murakami & Poai, supra note
180, at 186.
251 VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 237-53; see also Lucas, Murakami & Poai, supra note
180, at 176-86.
252 These leaders included Hawai'i Delegate to Congress, Prince Jonah Kiuhio
Kalaniana'ole, Territorial Senator John H. Wise, and Rev. Akaiko Akana. See generally,
Davianna Pomaika'i McGregor, 'Aina Ho'opulapula: Hawaiian Homesteading, 24
HAWAIIAN J. OF HIST. 1 (1990).
253 Id. at 14-30; Lucas, Murakami & Poai, supra note 180, at 182-87.
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released to others in a relatively short period of time."254 In this way, the
small n "native Hawaiian" is a term that has been controversial, in part,
because it was crafted and wielded by colonizers to facilitate the further
appropriation of indigenous land and other resources.
Hawai'i law, in part because of the incorporation of the HHCA into state
law,255 identifies a "native Hawaiian" using the blood quantum definition,
but uses the term "Hawaiian" more generally for those of indigenous
descent. The Hawai'i State Constitution does not specifically define
"Hawaiian" or "native Hawaiian," although the terms appear together in
Article XII, sections 5 and 6.256 Such definitions were entrusted to the
legislature, which enacted Act 196 governing the Office of Hawaiian
257Affairs in 1979, based on the new Constitutional mandate2. Act 196,
which was codified as chapter 10 of the Hawai'i Revised Statutes, included
definitions for "Hawaiian" and "native Hawaiian" in substantially the same
form as those proposed during the Constitutional Convention,258 with the
added requirement that aboriginal descendants show continued residence in
Hawai'i.
As demonstrated above, under both Hawai'i state law and U.S. federal
law, the term "native Hawaiian"-which the Burns article prefers-carries
the not less than fifty-percent Hawaiian blood quantum requirement. The
254 VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 247.
255 Section 4 of the Admission Act requires the State to adopt the HHCA as part of its
constitution and also provides that the "qualifications of lessees shall not be changed except
with the consent of the United States." Admission Act, supra note 181, § 4, 73 Stat. at 5.
256 HAW. CONST. art. XII, §§ 5-6. During the Constitutional Convention of 1978,
delegates proposed adding a definition section to the article on Hawaiian Affairs. Hawaiian
Affairs Comm., Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 59, 1 PROC. OF THE CONST. CONVENTION OF HAW. OF
1978, at 646-47 (1978). In an early version of the proposal, "native Hawaiian" was given a
descent-based definition, while "native Hawaiian of one-half blood" was given the definition
reserved to "native Hawaiian" in the HHCA. Id. at 646. This was proposed specifically to
address divisions and unfairness caused by defining only one-half blood Hawaiians as
"native Hawaiian." Id. at 647. Later in Convention proceedings, the proposed definitions
section was amended to define "Hawaiian" generally based on descent, and "native
Hawaiian" based on one-half part Hawaiian blood. Comm. of the Whole, Rep. No. 13, 1
PROC. OF THE CONST. CONVENTION OF HAW. OF 1978, at 1018 (1978). These definitions,
however, were invalidated when the Hawai'i Supreme Court held that the amendment had
not been presented to the public in a form allowing for informed ratification. Kahalekai v.
Doi, 60 Haw. 324, 343, 590 P.2d 543, 555 (1979).
257 Act of June 7, 1979, 1979 Haw. Sess. Laws 398 (codified at [Aw. REV. STAT ch. 10).
258 The actual definition of Hawaiian and native Hawaiian also includes the language that
the aboriginal peoples "exercised sovereignty and subsisted in the Hawaiian Islands." Id.
See SEN. STANDING COMM. REP. No. 773, 10th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 1979), reprinted in
1979 HAw. SEN. J. 1339, 1354-56 (1979), for an explanation of this language. See note 256,
supra, for further discussion of the reasons for and substance of the definitions proposed at
the Constitutional Convention.
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term "Hawaiian" as used in state law is analogous to the federal law term
"Native Hawaiian"-which Van Dyke utilizes-requiring Hawaiian
ancestry but no minimum blood quantum.
The Bums article's constrained analysis of the terms Hawaiian, Native
Hawaiian, and native Hawaiian misses the ultimate point. Although Queen
Lili'uokalani did indeed differentiate between "native" and "part-native,"
she referred in the same document to both groups as "my people," a term
that did not include the American-backed parties responsible for the 1893
illegal overthrow of her kingdom. 2 59 For the Native Hawaiian community,
blood quantum is an American-imposed concept, whose primary goal in the
HHCA was to limit lands for homesteading and eventually secure
additional lands for large corporate sugar and ranching interests.260 Thus,
Professor Van Dyke, in recognition of the divisive nature of the blood
quantum laws, chose to define Native Hawaiians to include all members of
our community.
2. The Burns article's use of "native Hawaiian" resurrects the
colonizer's narrative to minimize the claims ofHawai'i's indigenous people
Ultimately, the article's analysis of the terms Hawaiian, Native
Hawaiian, and native Hawaiian is emblematic of how this piece-
intentionally or not-seeks to revive the colonizer's collective memory of
Hawai'i. In that outdated and inaccurate version of 'his-story,' Hawai'i's
indigenous people cannot define themselves and neither can the State's
larger multicultural populace define Native Hawaiians. Instead, an almost
century-old definition is imported from Washington D.C.; a definition that
has been a lightning rod within the native community and continues to
divide and serve as a source of heartache and lawsuits. 2 6 ' As a community,
many indigenous Hawaiians have sought to move beyond blood quantum
and be more inclusive.262 Professor Van Dyke recognized and respected
that move towards greater inclusion.26 3
259 Protest to William Mckinley (June 17, 1897), reprinted in LILIUOKALANI, supra note
170, at 354-56.
260 VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 280-81; McGregor, supra note 252, at 27-30; J.
KEHAULANI KAUANUI, HAWAIIAN BLOOD: COLONIALISM AND THE POLITICS OF SOVEREIGNTY
AND INDIGENEITY 10-14, 37-38 (2008).
261 See, e.g., Day v. Apoliona, 616 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2010) (challenge to OHA's use of
trust funds for programs that serve both native Hawaiians and the larger Native Hawaiian
community); Kealoha v. Machado, 131 Hawai'i 62, 315 P.3d 213 (2013) (holding that OHA
trustees have broad discretion in use of trust funds to serve both native Hawaiians and the
broader Native Hawaiian population). See supra notes 251-253, and accompanying text
discussing the genesis of the blood quantum definition.
262 See, e.g., Derek H. Kauanoe & Breann Swann Nu'uhiwa, We Are Who We Thought
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The Bums article's focus on blood quantum demonstrates not only a lack
of sensitivity, but also misses a fundamental point, precisely as the U.S.
Supreme Court majority did in Rice v. Cayetano.26 4 For Native Hawaiians,
this is not about race.265 Certainly, racialization and racism were tools
colonizers effectively deployed to overthrow the Hawaiian Kingdom.266
But, at bottom, what was stolen was the political status of all citizens of the
Kingdom, not simply Kdnaka Maoli. 2 67  The collective memory of
Hawai'i's history must consider and grapple with these injustices.
With respect to the Crown Lands, similar to the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs' position in Rice, Kdnaka Maoli have international human rights
claims as a sovereign indigenous people, and are not seeking racial
preferences or special privileges.268  In 1893, annexationists, backed by
U.S. forces under U.S. minister to Hawai'i John Stevens, took control and
overthrew the Hawaiian monarchy. 269 Hawaiian culture quickly diminished
as foreigners continued to impose western culture throughout the
archipelago, condemning traditional practices, including medicinal healing,
hula, and our native language.27 0 In 1959, the United States returned most
of the ceded lands, which were "held in trust partially to benefit 'native
Hawaiians. "27 The State never acted on its obligations to native
Hawaiians, and as a result, specifically created OHA in 1978 to address
272Native Hawaiian needs and serve as a receptacle for reparations.
Professor Yamamoto highlighted that OHA and its voting limitation were
We Were: Congress' Authority to Recognize a Native Hawaiian Polity United by Common
Descent, 13 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 117 (2012) (providing a critical and contextual
inquiry into the question of whether the U.S. Congress may enact legislation recognizing the
self-governing authority of a Native Hawaiian people united by common descent, regardless
of blood quantum).
263 VAN DYKE, supra note 3, at 1.
264 Compare Burns, supra note 2, at 214-17, with Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 512-
17 (2000).
265 See Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1775-76.
266 Id. at 1775.
267 Kanalu Young, Kuleana: Toward a Historiography of Hawaiian National
Consciousness, 1780-2001, 2 HAw. J.L. POL. 1, 9-10 (2006) (noting that post-1795,
Hawaiian nationality was not race-based and was inclusive of non-Hawaiians).
268 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1775; see also G.A. Res 61/295, Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Oct. 2, 2007) (articulating the
rights of indigenous peoples as recognized by the U.N. General Assembly).
269 "The asserted reason for landing troops [in Hawai'i] was to protect American lives
and property." MacKenzie, supra note 5, at 20-21.
270 See Souza & Walk, 'Olelo Hawai'i and Native Hawaiian Education, in NATIVE
HAWAIIAN LAW, supra note 5, at 1270.
271 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1767.
272 id.
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"created by the overwhelming vote of Hawai'i's multiracial populace partly
to rectify the legacies of U.S. colonialism by affording Hawai'i's
indigenous peoples a measure of self-determination." 27 3 Therefore, at issue
here, as in Rice, is:
[N]ot simply the right to be equal but the right to self-determination; not a
right to monetary entitlements but to reparation; not a right to special
treatment but to reconnect spiritually with land and culture; not a right to
fuller participation in the U.S. polity but some form of governmental
sovereignty.274
In 1993, Congress passed the Apology Resolution to acknowledge the
government's immoral acts, apologize on behalf of the United States for its
role in the illegal overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, and commit to
reconciliation with Native Hawaiians.275 Professor Van Dyke's thoughtful
consideration of this collective memory of injustice and selection of the
term Native Hawaiian (with a capital N) extends the potential for healing
and justice for Kdnaka Maoli. I ka '61elo no ke ola.276
IV. I KA 'OLELO No KE OLA-WORDS CAN HEAL
Our collective memory of Hawai'i's history is critically important
because justice struggles for Kdnaka Maoli, and the related legal claims,
start with smaller disputes over memory, precisely like those presented in
Judge Burns' article and resolved by this response. Who is Native
Hawaiian? What were colonialism's initial and lasting influences and
impacts? What actually happened in the Mdhele? What were
Kamehameha III's true motives when he instituted a Native Hawaiian
hybrid of private property? Who was ultimately responsible for the illegal
overthrow of the sovereign Hawaiian Kingdom, and who transferred the
Kingdom's and monarch's substantial lands to the United States? Our
perceptions of those issues and events evolve over time, especially as
scholars and academics uncover new information or glean novel insight
from original material, particularly resources in 'Olelo Hawai'i such as the
Buke Mahele or Privy Council Records.277 Those perceptions are easily
influenced by images or narratives that can, in turn, undermine or undergird
273 Id. at 1773.
274 Id. at 1775.
275 See Apology Resolution, supra note 18; Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1772.
276 PUKUI, supra note 1, at 129 (translated here literally as "in the word there is life").
277 See, e.g., BEAMER, supra note 5 (interrogating ali'i agency through the Mahele
process in particular).
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Native Hawaiian legal claims.278 I ka '61elo no ke ola, i ka '61elo no ka
make.279
This is why the inaccurate and conflicting "history" that the Bums article
proffers is so problematic. As each of the examples detailed in Part III
illustrate, Bums' article ignores the leading experts in the fields of Native
Hawaiian history, culture, law, and politics, and instead relies on
questionable sources, including materials that were manufactured to justify
the American acquisition of the lands of Hawai'i's sovereign government
and monarchs. 28 0 Fortunately, more recent research, and Native Hawaiian
scholarship in particular, provides a compelling counter-narrative and clear
legal and moral bases for Kdnaka Maoli justice struggles and legal claims to
the Crown Lands specifically.28 '
As Professors Jonathan Osorio and Kamanamaikalani Beamer point out,
"Bums' own voice only rarely mak[es] pronouncements while most of the
text includes lengthy and digressing quotations from nineteenth century
observers[.]" 28 2 Even so, by resurrecting antiquated narratives that have
since been discredited by nearly four decades of research and scholarship,
the Bums article seeks to transform those old, erroneous memories into new
ones.28 3  By doing so, Native Hawaiians and our cultural practices and
history are framed in an exceedingly narrow way that confuses and
constrains the larger community's understanding of our legal claims.284
After all, "justice struggles through claims of right are, first and foremost,
active present-day struggles over collective memory. How a community
frames past events and connects them to current conditions often
determines the power of justice claims or of opposition to them." 28 5
In his Crown Lands book, Professor Van Dyke incorporated Native
Hawaiian scholarship and tenets to frame memories and illuminate a
narrative about the injustices committed against Native Hawaiians. He
sought to educate the larger community about the real history of Hawai'i in
278 See supra Part II.B.1.
279 PUKUI, supra note 1, at 129 (translated here literally as "in the word there is life; in the
word there is death").
280 See supra Part III; see also Osorio & Beamer, supra note 8; Andrade, supra note 7;
Poai, supra note 22.
281 See supra Part III.
282 Osorio & Beamer, supra note 8, at 471. Professors Osorio and Beamer likened
Burns' essay to memories of reading "the journals of two of the architects of the 1893
overthrow of the Hawaiian Kingdom, Sanford B. Dole and Lorrin Thurston," which was
"honestly a narrative we did not expect to read again after thirty years of steady and
responsible scholarship." Id. at 469.
283 See supra Section II.B.1.
284 See supra Section II.B.1.
285 Hom & Yamamoto, supra note 6, at 1771.
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a manner that would uplift both the collective memory of injustice and
Kdnaka Maoli communities and culture. He also endeavored to inspire both
a more informed understanding of Native Hawaiian justice claims and the
actions necessary to right those wrongs. In doing so, Professor Van Dyke's
words seek to advance healing and reparations for Native Hawaiians and
Hawai'i even after he has left us. I ka 'W1elo no ke ola.2 86
286 PUKUI, supra note 1, at 129 (translated here literally as "in the word there is life").
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